THE DIFFERENTIATION THEORY OF MEANING IN INDIAN LOGIC

by

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Dedicated to the people
of the land of Tibet
who for a thousand winters
preserved this apohasiddhiḥ
for us

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PREFACE

For the first time a complete rendering of *Apohasiddhiḥ* is presented here for the English reader of philosophical acumen and for those who are interested in the study of the development of logic in India. *Apohasiddhiḥ* was written in about the one thousand and fiftieth year of the Christian calendar, its author being Ratnakīrti, the last Indian logican of the Buddhist Order.

For centuries this text and the other writings of Ratnakīrti and of several other renowned Buddhist philosophers, such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, were not extant in India. However, they were preserved in the monasteries of Tibet for more than a thousand years. The late Mahāpaṇḍita Rāhula Sānkṛityāyana visited that land of the Lamas four times in 1929, 1934, 1936, and 1938 spending fifteen months in the first, and six months in each of the subsequent trips, making discoveries, examining, copying and getting photographs of the rare MSS. Subsequently he succeeded in bringing back to India photographs of more than eighty works which were deposited with the Bihar Research Society at Patna, Bihar State in India.[1] Now, from that treasure of photoscripts, Professor Anantlal Thakur has published Ratnakīrti's twelve monographs entitled *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali.*[2] He has also edited works of Ratnakīrti's guru Jñānaśrīmitra, *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali.*[3] Since both of these volumes contain separate works on *apoha* and on comparison it is evident that Ratnakīrti borrowed extensively from his guru.

[1] Cf. Introduction, *PVP*.
[2] (= *Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series*, Vol. III) (Patna, Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1957).
[3] (= *Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series*, Vol. V) (1959).

There are only two published editions of *Apohasiddhiḥ*. The first one was edited by Haraprasad Shastri in *The Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*.[4] The Second edition is that by Anantalal Thakur in *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali*. There is no significant difference between these two texts; minor differences of reading are pointed out in footnotes. However, from the point of view of philosophical discussion these are of little importance. The first edition is here abbreviated as *AS.*, and the second as *RN*. In our transcribed text, however, page-line references correspond to the first edition.

As is usually the case with Indian philosophers, there is not much to report about the life of Ratnakīrti. What little is known of him has already been stated by Anantalal Thakur in the introduction of *RN*. We learn there that Ratnakīrti was a favourite pupil of Jñānaśrīmitra and that both were resident paṇḍita at Vikramaśilā seminary; that our author was a scholar and a poet of fame and that he was a practicing Tāntrika, a member of Lokāyata Buddhist sect which was popular in the Eastern India and Bengal in the ninth and tenth centuries. Thakur has written a well documented introduction and thus saved us the time and effort of making historical and textual studies of *Apohasiddhiḥ*.

Apohasiddhiḥ covers the many interrelated problems of *meaning* such as its epistemological, logical and ontological aspects. It is an extremely difficult treatise inasmuch as the author did not clearify many terms and issues, assuming that they were known to his philosophically oriented readers. Stcherbatsky in his monumental work *Buddhist Logic* translated Vācaspatimiśra's *Apohavāda* section of *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā*.[5] Our text *AS.*, however, received a short and unfavourable remark from Stcherbatsky since it was "written in one night and probably for this reason lacking clearness".[6] Stcherbatsky's statement is only partially true. As we have said *AS.* is a difficult work but adducing as a reason for this the supposed fact that "it was written in one night" is unjustified. Stcherbatsky apparently misread the closing passage written by a copyist named Trailokyadatta who said: "This work *Apohasiddiḥ*

[4] (= *Bibliotheca Indica Series*) (Calcutta, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1910).
[5] (Benares ed., 1925), pp. 483-491.
[6] *BL.*, Vol. II, p. 404.

of Ratnakīrti has been copied in beautiful hand by Trailokyadatta *in one full night and two quarters of the day*".[7] The passage is evidently not part of the text. It is, in fact, only an appendix provided by the copywriter. I am, however, inclined to believe that the irksomeness of Ratnakīrti's text is due to its logical nature. Moreover, as Thakur suggests "its being a summary of a bigger work of Jñānaśrīmitra, viz. the *Apohaprakaraṇa*",[8] may contribute to its opacity.

Because the nuances of logical, epistemological and ontological import of certain Sanskrit terms are ignored, quite often ambiguity prevails in studies of Indian philosophy. Sometimes an ancient writer is unaware of the precise distinctions to be drawn. On other occasions a modern translator fails to recognise such differences. Two Sanskrit terms, for example, *abhāva* (non-existence) and *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) are treated as synonymous by most modern writers of history of Indian Philosophy. In my article "Epistemological Negative Dialectics of Indian Logic: *abhāva* versus *anupalabdhi*",[9] I have discussed the dialectical problem arising from two very different theories referred to by these terms. It is, however, a point of great satisfaction to me that our Ratnakīrti shows marked awareness of the peculiar nature of problems related to particular Sanskrit expressions. In the present translation I have tried to maintain and observe such distinct usage of Sanskrit terms. Nevertheless, on occasions, I may have failed simply because I am accustomed to rendering Sanskrit either in the traditional or in the Stcherbatskyian manner.

Often Indian logic is described as intensional.[10] J. F. Staal has written on its *extensional* character.[11] At this stage of the study of Indian logic, I think, such views should be admitted with caution and reservation. Here in dealing with *apoha* for instance, we find a different type of Indian logic. The problems we meet are essenti-

[7] *AS.*, p. 19.

[8] *RN.*, p. 13 n. 1.

[9] *Indo-Iranian Journal*, Vol. IX, pt. 4, 1966.

[10] Cf. I. M. Bochenski, *History of Formal Logic* (1961), p. 446; also Hidenori Kitagawa, "A note on the Methodology in the Study of Indian Logic", *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (January 1960).

[11] Cf. Staal, "Formal Structure in Indian Logic", *Synthese*, Vol. XII, No. 218 (September 1960), pp. 279-286.

ally concerned with propositional attitude, the logical nature of *meaning* and the subject-predicate relation or dharma-dharmi-sambandha. The Buddhist logicians here seem to be dealing with propositions rather than with entities as is the case with the realist thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā schools.

There are still numerous important Sanskrit logical works which are for various reasons inaccessible to us. Some were reported to have been preserved for centuries in the six famous monasteries of Tibet, but in the face of the present political turmoil in that land of the Eternal Peace, these are feared to be lost forever. There are also works which are available only in Chinese and Japanese versions. There exist no English translation of them, and in many cases the original Sanskrit versions are not extant either. Thus, in order to salvage such an interesting logico-philosophical heritage from time's cruel hands, there is an urgent need for a consortium of scholars of Tibetan, Japanese, Sanskrit and of Western Languages and logic to work together probably under the auspices of some UNESCO type international agency.

I disagree with those who have persistently presupposed the transcendental nature of Indian philosophy *in toto*. There are many other interesting aspects of Indian thinking developed during the long history of more than two millennium. And I believe, as Bimal Krishna Matilal says, "that India should not, indeed cannot, be left out of any general study of the history of logic and philosophy".[12] With this view, I submit this analysis of an important logical treatise *Apohasiddhiḥ* of Ratnakīrti to evidence that not all Indian thinkers are wholly preoccupied with matters transcendental. If it succeeds in rousing some academic controversies, I shall deem my labour rewarded. For as it is said in an Indian maxim: Truth emerges out of controversies – *vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhaḥ*. No one knows defects of the work so well as the author himself. This is, however, a beginning of the study of Ratnakīrti's monographs. I hope that it will be followed by scholars of greater competence and with deeper indulgence.

[12] *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation. The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-Nyāya Philosophy* (= *Harvard Oriental Series*, Vol. 46) (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968), p. x.

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LOGICAL MAXIMS

Dignāga (Circa 400 A.D.)

'vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabdayonayaḥ.'
Words are derived from concepts and vice versa, concepts are derived from words.

'apohaḥ śabda-liṅgābhyām prakāśyate.'
Differentiation is manifested through *word* and *reason.*

'na sambandhaḥ indriyeṇa gṛhyate.' (*PRAMĀṆA Samuccaya*, II, 28). The relation is never cognised through senses.

Dharmakīrti (Circa 550 A.D.)

'anyonyopalabdhi-parihārasthiti-lakṣaṇatā vā virodho nityānitya-vat.' (PVS., p. 36).
Contradiction consists in the *mutual exclusion* of terms, as between *eternal* and *non-eternal.*

'samvṛttisad eva dharmi-dharmalakṣaṇam.' (PVP., p. 573).
Subject-predicate relation is but dialectical.

'nahy anvayo'vyāvṛttimato nāpy ananvayino vyāvṛttih.' (PVS., p. 353).
That which cannot be affirmed, cannot be denied; nor can that be denied which cannot be affirmed.

'sāmānyam anyavyāvṛittilakṣaṇam.' (PV., III, 30)
The universal is in its very essence exclusion of the discrepant

Ratnakīrti (1050 A.D.)

'trividho hi dharmo dṛṣṭaḥ. kaścit vastuniyato nīlādi. Kaścit avastuniyato yathā sarvopākhyā virahaḥ. kaścid ubhaya-sādhāraṇo yathā' nupalabdhimātram.'

(kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ, RN., p. 82) Predicates are of three types: 1) that which is based on a factual thing (substance?), e.g., *blue* etc. (X is blue); 2) that which is based on a non-factual thing, e.g., proposition 'negation of all discernible;' 3) that which is common both- factual and non-factual things, e.g., *non-apprehension* of that which exists and that which does not exist,

ABBREVIATIONS*

AS.	*Apoha-siddhiḥ* of Ratnakīrti, ed. by Harasprasad Shastri.
Ab.	Abhāva.
Atomism.	*Indian Logic and Atomism* by A. B. Keith.
B. Cin.	*Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi* by Gāgābhaṭṭa.
B. Flux.	*Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* by S. Mookerjee.
BI.	*Bibliotheca Indica.*
BL.	*Buddhist Logic* by Stcherbatsky.
CSS.	*Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.*
Das. Sās.	*Vaiśeṣika Philosophy of Dasapadārtha Sāstra* by H. Ui.
DD.	*Darshana-digdarshana* (Hindi) by Rāhula Sānkṛtyāyana.
E. Schools.	*Indian Logic in the Eearly Schools* by H. N. Randle.
Essentials.	*Essentials of Indian Philosophy* by M. Hiriyanna.
HIE.	*History of Indian Epistemology* by J. Prasad.
HIL.	*History of Indian Literature.*
HIP.	*History of Indian Philosophy.*
IP.	*Indian Philosophy* by S. Radhakrishnan.
IPP.	*Indian Psychology*: Perception by J. Sinha.
JN.	*Jñānaśrīnibandhāvalī*, ed. by A. Thakur.
JRAS.	*The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London.
JS.	*Jaimini Sūtra.*
KSS.	*Kashi Sanskrit Series.*
Kir.	*Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana
Lak.	*Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana.
Materials.	*Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* by D. H. H. Ingalls.
Metaphysics.	*Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics* by S. Bhaduri.
MM.	*Mānameyodaya* by Nārāyaṇa.
MNP.	*Mīmāṃsā. Nyāya-Prakāśa* by Sarvajñātma Muni.
N.	*Nyāya.*
NBh.	*Nyāya-sūtra Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana.
NB.	*Nyāya-bindu* of Dharmakīrti.
NBT.	*Nyāya-bindu-tikā of Dharmottara.*
NK.	*Nyāya-kandalī* of Śrīdhara with Praśastapāda Bhāṣya.
N. Kaust.	*Nyāya-Kaustubha* by Puṇatāmakara.

* For details of publication see Bibliography.

NL.	*Nyāya-līlāvatī* of Vallabhācārya with three commentaries, *Kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, Prakāśa, and Prakāśavivṛti.
NM.	*Nyāya-Mañjari* of Jayantabhaṭṭa.
NR.	*Nyāya-ratnākara* commentary on Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa by Pārthasārathi Miśra.
NS.	*Nyāya-Sūtra* of Gotama.
NVT.	*Nyāya-vārttika* by Uddyotakara.
NVTT.	*Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭikā* by Vācaspati Miśra.
NASVVT.	*Nyāyāvatāra-sūtra-vārttika-vṛtti-ṭikā* of Śānti Sūri.
Outlines.	*Outlines of Indian Philosophy* by M. Hiriyanna.
PBh.	Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda called *Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha* published with *NK.*
PKM.	*Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* by Prabhāchandra.
PM.	*Padārtha-Maṇḍana* of Veṇidatta.
PTN.	*Padārtha-tattva-nirupaṇa* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.
PM. Sources	*Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources* by G. Jhā.
PR.	*The Philosophical Review.*
Primer.	*Primer of Indian Logic* (According to Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṃgraha) by Kuppuswami Sastri.
PSPM.	*Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* by Jha.
PV.	*Pramāṇa-vārttika* of Dharmakīrti.
PVP.	-Do- with the commentary of Prajñākaragupta.
PVS.	-Do- with the auto-commentary '*Svavṛtti*' ed. Rāhula Sānkrtyāyana.
PVST.	-Do- with the commentary '*Ṭikā*' by Karṇakagomin on Dharmakīrti's *PVS.*
RN.	*Ratnakīrti-nibandhāvalī* (including *AS.*) ed. Thakur.
ŚBh.	*Śabara-bhāṣya.*
S. Dīpika	*Śāstra-Dīpikā* of Pārthasāvathi Misra.
SM.	Siddhānta-Muktāvalī with Kārikāvalī of Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana.
SP.	*Sapta-padārthī* of Śivāditya Miśra.
Śl. Vārt. or *SV.*	*Mīmāṃsā-Śloka-Vārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.
Thesism.	*Theism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* by C. Bulcke S. J.
Tr. Sam.	*Tarkasaṃgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa.
TSC.	*Tarkasaṃgrahacandrikā* a commentary on Tr. Sam.
VS.	*Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* of Kaṇāda.
V. System.	*Vaiśeṣika System* by B. Faddegon.
WZKM.	*Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes.*

INTRODUCTION

A. ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ANCIENT INDIAN THINKERS:

I reproduce here with minor variation and additions, what Bertrand Russell has said on attitudes towards the ancient Greeks.[1] I do so for two reasons: to determine our attitude towards the study of the ancient thinkers, and to show that what is true about the Greeks is to some extent also true about the Indians. That is, there is a pervasive unity of human thought, however great the geographical and historical distances which separate people.

Two opposing attitudes towards the Ancient Indians are commonly found at present. One view regards the Indians "with almost superstitious reverence", as the knowers of all the truth of mysteries, "as the inventors of all that is best, and as men of superhuman genius whom the moderns cannot hope to equal. The other attitude, inspired by the triumphs of science and by an optimistic belief in progress, considers the authority of the ancients an incubus, and maintains that most of their contributions to thought are now best forgotten." I, myself, cannot subscribe to either of these extreme views; each, I maintain, is partly true and partly false.

"As to the nature and structure of the world, various hypotheses are possible. Progress in metaphysics, so far as it has existed, has consisted in a gradual refinement of all these hypotheses, a development of their implications, and a reformulation of each to meet the objections urged by adherents of rival hypotheses. To learn to conceive the universe according to each of these systems is an

[1] *History of Western Philosophy* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1965), pp. 38-39.

imaginative delight and an antidote to dogmatism. Moreover, even if no one of the hypotheses can be demonstrated, there is genuine knowledge in the discovery of what is involved in making each of them consistent with itself and with known facts. Now almost all the hypotheses that have dominated modern philosophy were first thought of by (the ancient Indians); their imaginative inventiveness in abstract matters can hardly be too highly praised. What I shall have to say about (the Indians) will be said mainly from this point of view; I shall regard them as giving birth to theories which have had an independent life and growth, and which, though at first somewhat infantile, have proved capable of surviving and developing throughout more than two thousand years.

(The Indians) contributed something else which proved of more permanent value to abstract thought: they discovered mathematics and the art of deductive reasoning." Algebra, in particular, is an Indian contribution to the world progress. "The debt of the Western world to India in this respect cannot be overestimated. Most of the great discoveries and inventions of which Europe is so proud would have been impossible without a developed system of mathematics, and this in turn would have been impossible if Europe had been shackled by the unwieldy system of Roman numerals. The unknown man who devised the new system was from the world's point of view, after the Buddha, the most important son of India."[2] The first atomic theory was taught by "Pakudha Kātyāyana, an older contemporary of the Buddha, and was therefore earlier than that of Democritus".[3] "But in connection with mathematics (and the other theories) the one-sidedness of (the ancient Indian) genius appears: mostly it reasoned deductively from what appeared self-evident, not inductively from what had been observed. It has only been very slowly that scientific method, which seeks to reach principles inductively from observation of particular facts, has replaced the (Indian and the western) Hellenic belief in deduction from luminous axioms derived from the mind of the philosopher. For this reason, apart from others, it is a mistake to treat the

[2] A. L. Bashman, *The Wonder that was India* (New York, Grove Press, 1959), p. 496.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 497.

(Ancients) with superstitious reverence. Scientific method (as we understand it today), though some few among them were the first men who had an inkling of it, is, on the whole, alien to their temper of mind, and the attempt to glorify them by belittling the intellectual progress of the last four centuries has (had a stultifying) effect upon modern thought.

There is, however, a more general argument against reverence, whether for (the Indians) or for anyone else. In studying a philosopher, the attitude (ought to be neither reverence nor contempt), but first a kind of hypothetical sympathy, until it is possible to know what it feels like to believe in his theories, and only then a revival of the critical attitude, which should resemble, as far as possible, the state of mind of a person abandoning opinions which he has hitherto held. Contempt interferes with the first part of this process, and reverence with the second. Two things are to be remembered: that a man whose opinions and theories are worth studying may be presumed to have had some intelligence, but that no man is likely to have arrived at complete and final truth on any subject whatever. When an intelligent man expresses a view which seems to us obviously absurd, we should not attempt to prove that it is somehow true, but we should try to understand how it ever came to *seem* true. This exercise of historical and psychological imagination at once enlarges the scope of our thinking, and helps us to realize how foolish many of our own cherished prejudices will seem to an age which has a different temper of mind."

B. ON THE STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN ANCIENT INDIA

Study of language began in India as early as eight hundred years before Christ,[4] for Yāska, circa 700 B.C.,[5] the author of a much

[4] Cf. Siddheshwar Varma, *The Phonetic Observations of Indian Grammarians* (Delhi, Munshi Ram Manoharlal, 1961), p. 21.

[5] Usually Yāska is dated as 500 B.C. Cf. A. L. Basham, *op. cit.*, p. 387; A. A. Macdonell, *Sanskrit Grammar* (Oxford University Press, third edition 1959), p. x. But if Pāṇini is placed in 400 B.C. his classical language would require at least 300 years to develop from that of Yāska's Vedic language.

advanced study of Vedic language *Nirukta,* refered to several of his predecessors, namely, Audumbarāyaṇa, Śākatāyana, Gārgya,[6] and others. Yāska is, however, remembered for his ingenuity of dividing language into four parts: names, verbs, prefixes and prepositions.[7] The ancient Indians had evidently, by the fifth century B.C., arrived at the scientific conclusions that words for the most part consist on the one hand of roots, and on the other of affixes, which when compounded with the former, modify the radical sense in various ways.[8] Pāṇini, author of the "shortest and fullest grammar in the world"[9] mentioned no fewer than sixty-four predecessors in the field whose purely grammatical works have been lost to us entirely. Pāṇini, who lived in about four century B.C.,[10] was also primarily concerned with forms of language, with speech and its parts. From Patañjali (200 B.C.), however, we learn that in the Pāṇinian system the relation between a word and its meaning is regarded as *established* or *eternal* (siddha).[11] However, the referend of a word in a system can be both a particular (dravya)

[6] Macdonell, *op. cit.*, p. xi-xii. *Nirukta*, I.i, with Durgā's commentary, ed. R. G. Bhadkamkar (= *Sanskrit and Prakrit Series*) (Bombay, 1942).

[7] "catvāri padajātāni. nāmākhyāte co'pasarganipātāśca." *Ibid.*

[8] Macdonell, *op. cit.*, p. x.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. xi.

[10] Macdonell placed him about 300 B.C. His argument is that Pāṇini uses the word *yavanāni*, which Kātyāyana (the commentator) explains as "writing of the Yavanas" (i.e. Iaones or Greeks). "Now it is not at all likely that the Indians should have become acquainted with Greek writing before the invasion of Alexander in 327 B.C. But the natives of the extreme north-west, of whom Pāṇini in all probability was one, would naturally have become acquainted with it soon after that date. They must, however, have grown familiar with it before a grammarian would make a rule as to how to form from Yavana, 'Greek', a derivative form meaning 'Greek writing'. It seems therefore hardly possible to place Pāṇini earlier than about 300 B.C.", *op. cit.*, pp. x-xi. The argument is not very convincing. We know now for certain that Alexander's invasion was prompted by traders' and travelers' tales about that country. Hence the two peoples must have learned about each others' civilization much before to the invasion. It is possible that the two peoples could have learned about each other much earlier and without the invasion. To know others, invasions might be sufficient, but are surely not necessary conditions.

[11] "siddhe śabdārtha sambandhe" Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya,* with commentaries *pradīpa* of Kaiyata, *uddyota* of Nāgeśa, and Rudradhara Sharma's *tattvāloka* (= *Kashi Sanskrit Series,* 153) (Benares, 1954), p. 35, on I.i. 1.

or a class or configuration (ākṛti).[12] In a certain case the referend may be a particular; in another a universal. A word can stand for an individual thing as well as for classes. Thus it refers to both individuals and universals.

It is evident that these writers of antiquity were primarily concerned with problems of grammatical nature, of logical syntax, of forms and parts of speech. Logical and epistemological aspects of the problem of *Meaning* were, however, of little interest; that was the task of the philosophers. Philosophical investigation into the nature of a word and its relation to meaning occurs in the early 'Sūtra' writings, namely, the *Jaimini-sūtra*, the *Nyāya-sūtra*, and the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, dating between 500 B.C. to 200 A.D.[13] However, from the grammarian Patañjali we also learn that as concerns the question of the nature of 'referend' there were two schools of thought: one which believed that the referend of word was the particular; and the other which maintained that it was the universal. Vyāḍhi, for instance, subscribed to the former view, while Vājapyāyana held the latter.[14] In the Sūtra writings these two conflicting positions correspond to the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā respectively. Nevertheless, in the later development of philosophical systems, as we shall see below, most of the non-Buddhist thinkers synthesized the two views and contended that a word refers to both *particular* and *universal.* The Mīmāṃsā held that it denoted a genus, and only indirectly referred to the particular.[15] But the Nyāya maintained that it denoted three things: an individual, the class residing in the individual, and its configuration or form.[16] It is interesting to note, however, that not unlike the Greek and Christian philosophers of the west,[17] the early Brahmanic thinkers

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 38, on I.i. 1.
[13] Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, and C. A. Moore (eds.), *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 356, 386, 425, 487.
[14] Cp. R. C. Pandey, *The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1963), p. 17.
[15] "sāmānyam śabdagocaram." Kumārilabhaṭṭa's *Śloka-vārttikam* (= *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*, Section *ākṛti*, verse 4) (Banares, 1898-1899) (*SV.*).
[16] "vyakty-ākṛti-jātayastu padārthāh." *Nyāyasūtra*, II.ii.68. (*NS.*).
[17] Cp. Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (= New York, Simon and Schuster, eleventh paperback edition, 1965), pp. 37, 351, 456.

of India viewed Word or *Śabda* with a kind of mystical awe, with an admixture of religious reverence.[18] It was most probably this attitude toward language which, I believe, in earlier periods hampered the progress of formal logic in India. However, with the rise of the Buddhist systems,[19] by the time of Dignāga (400 A.D.) and Dharmakīrti (c. 550 A.D.) the Buddhists had developed their own philosophical disciplines, in many cases far more advanced than their Brahamnic peers, and it was mainly for the Buddhists that Indian formal logic arrived at its *take off* stage. It was Dignāga's meaning theory *Differentiation* (apoha) and his view of Inference (vyāpti) that immensely influenced the whole *reasoning* of the post-Dignāga philosophers of his country. Dignāga, the greatest Indian logician, founded "an idealistic but unorthodox logical school" called "Vijñānavāda".[20] It is to his school that a host of brilliant logicians and commentators belong, such as Prajñākaragupta (750 A.D.), Dharmottara (800), Śāntarakṣita (700), Kamalaśīla (725), Karṇakagomin (875), Jñānaśrīmitra[21] (1025) and his pupil Ratnakīrti.[22] Our present study deals with a single monograph of this last Indian Buddhist logician, of his analysis of the *Differentiation Theory of Meaning, Apoha* which was originally propounded by Dignāga.[23]

[18] Cp., Pandey, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-16.

[19] It is appropriately customary to speak of a 'system' rather than an individual philosopher for in Indian scene *individuals* appear to be advancing doctrines of their respective school and less apt to assert individual thesis.

[20] I. M. Bochenski, *A History of Formal Logic*, translated by I. Thomas (University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), p. 418 (*HFL*).

[21] Jñānaśrīmitra must not be confused with the Kashmirian Jñānaśrībhadra who too is often being quoted as simply "Jñānaśrī" CP. Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, v.I. p. 42, n. 1.

[22] On dates and interrelation of the different philosophers of the Buddhist, Brahmanic and the Jaina schools, see the great Buddhologist late Mahāpaṇḍit Rāhula Sānkṛityāyana's Introduction (in Sanskrit), *Pramāṇa-vārttika-bhāshyam* of Prajñākaragupta (= *Tibetan Sanskrit Series*, Vol. I) (Patna, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953), pp. dha, na ta. (*PVP.*)

[23] For a detailed study of the development of different schools of logic before Dignāga the reader is referred to an excellent exposition by Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, v.I, pp. 2-31; for the development of neo-formal logic after 1100 A.D., cp. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (= *Harvard Oriental Series*, Vol. 40) (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951), *passim*.

C. WHAT IS APOHA?

The first exposition of *apoha* occurs in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[24] This *meaning* theory entails many logical, epistemological and metaphysical problems, and for this reason it was discussed by practically every philosopher of the post-Dignāga period.

Apoha has had a more complex and interesting development than is usually realized. It has probably engendered a longer polemic than any other philosophical problem. In Buddhist logic it is at least as important as inference or *vyāpti*, and it is no exaggeration to assert that *apoha* has played a very significant role in the formulation of many logical concepts. However, because of its formal nature it has been the theory most misunderstood, not only by its opponents, but also in some cases by a few Buddhist thinkers.

A host of writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā schools, for instance, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (600 A.D.),[25] Vācaspati (976)[26] and his guru Trilocana, and Udayana (1050 A.D.)[27] criticised the theory for its so-called negativity.

Among modern writers too, it seems to be a common belief that in its origin *apoha* was "a negative meaning theory" and that only under the Realists' criticism did certain later Buddhists, such as

[24] *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, (Chapter V). Not extant in Sanskrit but Tibetan version is preserved in the Tanjure collections of the Lamas. It can be seen at the Liberary of the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, Sikkim via India. A partially restored version, ed. by H. R. Rangaswamy Iyengar (Mysore, University of Mysore, 1930).

[25] Cf. *Śloka-vārttika*, (= *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*) (Benares, 1898-99), ch. on *apohavāda*. (*Śl. Vārt.*)

[26] *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyyaṭīkā* (= *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*) (Benares), pp. 478-491. Vācaspati mentioned the date of his composition of *Nyāyasūchinibandha* as "vasu-aṅka-vasu-vatsara" i.e., 898, and since he did not specify the era, it was generally thought to be the Vikrama era and so his date was recognized as 841 A.D. According to the latest researches, it was the Śaka era. Hence he composed the work in 976 A.D. cf. D. C. Bhattacharya, "Date of Vāchaspati Miśra and Udayanāchārya", *Jha Research Institute Journal*, Vol. II, pp. 349-356, quoted by A. Thakur, *R.N.*, p. 21 n. 4.

[27] The author of *Ātmatattva-viveka* and *Kiraṇāvalī* vehemently criticised the Buddhist doctrine of Flux, universals, and *apoha*. Udayana must have been a contemporary of Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti, for he extensively quotes from their works and refers to them as *pūrvapaksin*. Cp. A. Thakur, *JN.*, Introduction, pp. 32-36. Hence, I am inclined to place Udayana's date circa 1050 A.D.

Śāntarakṣita and Ratnakīrti, modify the theory by suggesting that it was not a purely negative view of meaning.[28]

While reading Ratnakīrti and comparing him with Dharmakīrti[29] and with Dignāga's scattered quotations in *PV.*, one becomes aware of certain fundamental problems of Buddhist logic and their correlation with the *apoha* theory. In concurrence with the Buddhist doctrine of Universal Flux and the consequent momentariness of the Real, one could not postulate a purely negative view of *Meaning* and *Knowledge*. Negativity would also be contrary to the Buddhist doctrines of sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

According to the *apoha* theory words are the results of mental conceptualisation, and hence they refer to mental concepts and cannot be directly associated with external realities. Meaning, thus, denotes the *referend*,[30] the instrument in an act of reference as distinct from the *referent*, the object towards which the act of reference is directed. Nevertheless, if this *referend* is termed as *universal*, the Buddhist would regard it only a logical concept, not an object inherently residing in the external bodies. For him universals are *post res*. Thus, *meaning* means the relation of *word* and concept. It is not directly associated with external object; it cannot, therefore, refer to the object.

According to the Buddhist conception of universal flux it is the extreme point-instant real (kṣaṇika) which has causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva). And it is this momentary that is grasped at

[28] Cf. J. Sinha, *History of Indian Philosophy* (*HIP.*), Vol. I (Calcutta, Sinha Publishing House, 1956), pp. 331-333, 883; K. K. Raja, "The Theory of Meaning According to the Buddhist Logicians", *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XVIII, pt. 3-4; R. C. Pandey, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

[29] *Pramāṇa-vārttika* (*PV.*) with auto-commentary by Dharmakīrti, and *ṭikā* by Karṇakagomin (*PVST.*) ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana (Allahabad, Kitab Mahal, 1943). Another ed. by Raniero Gnoli, with autocommentary only (= *Serie Orientale Roma*, XXIII) (Rome, 1960). Also cp. *PVP.*, *passim.*

[30] Note in Latin 'instrument' is the term that ends in *-ent*, an active gerund participle *-ens*, *-entis* whereas the designatum is the referend *-endus*, *a*, *um* the passive gerund. I owe this information to Agehanand Bharati. However, the logicians are apt to disregard the grammarians' rules. My usage of these terms namely *referend* and *referent* is based on the authority of Ledger Wood, see article on "Referend", *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. D. Runes (Ames, Iowa, Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1959).

the first moment of sense-stimulus. But since everything is in constant *flux*, what is cognised by the intellect following the first moment of sensation is not the external thing but the conceptualised universal. Now it is this conceptualised world which is referred to by words. If words meant the objects of senses, our experiences of language would be the same as those of the sense-object-contact in perception. Then, the mere pronouncement of words, for instance, honey (madhu) and fire (agni) would suffice to produce the effects of sweet taste and burning sensation, respectively; all judgmental functions, syllogistic formulations, and poetical expressions, suggestion and pun etc., would be impossible.[31]

The theory *apoha* is primarily directed against the pluralistic conception of a static Reality in which Universals are postulated as physical facts. For the nominalist Buddhist, since reality is the extreme point-instant it is beyond any propositional attitude. And the universal has no efficient function; it does not produce a sense-stimulus reflex (pratibhāsa).[32] Nor can it be inferred as an individual entity through a valid *reason* (liṅga), for it is a non-empirical constructed fact (vikalpa). Thence, the universal must be conceived as the idea of "exclusion of a common counter-correlate". In Dharmakīrti's phrase: "The Universal is in its very essence exclusion of the other".[33] And this is what is meant by the term *apoha*: the *exclusion* or *differentiation* of the thing from *the other things*. Dignāga explains *apoha* as follows: "the meaning of a word consists in a repudiation of the discrepant meaning".[34] Thus, for instance, the meaning of the word c-o-w (to take the stock example of the Indians), is the judgment 'cow = not-not-cow'. The ascertainment of the cow is based on the exclusion of all the cases of 'not-cow'. And since the word cannot refer to the *external* object, it refers to a concept which is formed by observation of similar and dissimilar cases. We know what a thing is by cognising what it is *not*; we thus, know its distinctness by inference from all

[31] Cf. Ratnakīrti, *AS.*, p. (9, 12-13), p. (18. 16-18).
[32] Cf. Ratnakīrti, *AS.* (6. 6-7) and Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, Vol. II, p. 266.
[33] *PV.*, III. 30: "sāmānyam anya-vyāvṛttilakṣaṇam."
[34] *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, V. 2, of Jinendrabuddhi, translated by Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, Vol. I, p. 461f. Also cp. Bochenski, *HFL.*, p. 441 (54.01).

cases of not-the-thing. Considering 'not-the-thing' as the compliment of the thing this complement would mean that the complement of the complement of a class[35] is that class itself. That is the term *not-cow* means 'negation of *cow-ness*', and this in fact, means another class, a class of lions, horses, mountains, moons, etc. which are the cases of *not-cow*, 'the other than'. The term *sāmānya* then refers to the complement of the thing (A), and this is expressed by the term *apoha* i.e., $X =$ *not-not-being* X.[36]

From the foregoing it is clear that what is intended by the *apoha* theory of *meaning* is neither merely a positive cognition of a thing, nor merely 'a negative meaning', a mere negation of 'the other things', but an *a priori* judgment, namely, the differentiation of the thing A and not-the-thing.[37] The theory then, appears to be somewhat similar to the modern logical view that "the negation of a true statement is false; the negation of a false statement is true".[38]

The difference between the modern and the ancient views, however, is that modern philosophers are concerned with the question of ascertaining the truth of a proposition whereas the ancients are dealing with the problem of ascertaining the true function of *meaning*.

D. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF APOHA

Etymological meaning of *apoha*: the term *apoha* literally means exclusion, separation, differentiation – (Sanskrit: apa + uha = apoha), and is commonly taken as an abridged form of a compounded phrase 'other + exclusion' = (anya + apoha = anyāpoha). Etymologically this compound can be explained in three ways:

[35] Note: the Indian realist would prefer *universal* for the Sanskrit terms *sāmānya* or *jāti* whereas the Buddhist logicians' *sāmānya* is closer to *class*. However here I have used them as synonyms.

[36] "kalpitaścākāro' pohāśritatvād apoha ucyate." Karṇakagomin, *PVST.*, p. 114 Universal or class (ākāra = *Gestalt*) is a concept and called *apoha*, for it is grounded on the exclusions of a common-counter correlate.

[37] Cf. *AS.*, p. (3.6-8); *PVS.*, p. 251.

[38] Cf. W. V. O. Quine, *Methods of Logic* (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964) (revised ed.), p. 2.

(1) Either: The thing (*A*) is excluded from the other (*non-A*), or, the other (*non-A* = B) from the thing (*A*);

(2) Or: the other (*non-A* = *B*) is differentiated out in the midst of the thing (*A*).

(3) Or: *apoha* is the mere denial of the other *non-A*.[39]

In the first two renderings it is simply the thing as an external object or as a mental object (form) which is cognisized as being the meaning of *apoha*. In the third rendering it is a negative fact, a mere opposition or exclusion without any positive basis.[40] All these three renderings are incorrect. Because *apoha* is not designed to mean neither an external nor an internal object; nor a positive (Ens) or negative (non-Ens) entity. Then, Ratnakīrti affirms, what is intended by *apoha* is indeed an affirmative statement whose truth is ascertained by the exclusion of its contradictory.[41]

However, the *apoha* theory does not exclusively refer to statements only. And viewing it from the much broader perspective of cognition it means 'differentiation' which in turn is judgmental and thus covers all contents of judgment. For instance, all knowledge which is expressible in words, names, is derived through inference and is *differentiative*. At the moment a thing is cognised in the intellect, the very first *attributive* form that ascertained in the cognition is its distinctness from all other cognitions. Nevertheless, this must not be construed as a completely negative *meaning*. On the contrary, what *apoha* means is, in fact, a logical function of language which correspondance to a priori principle of *differentiation* but the ultimate object of knowledge is the point-instant physical fact. At this point Ratnakīrti categorically reaffirms the logical sense of *apoha* paraphrasing and supplementing what Dignāga, the founder-father of the theory, had said:

Differentation is the *meaning* of language or word. What is meant by

[39] "kim idam anyasmād apohyate, asmād vā anyad apohyate; asmin vānyad apohyate; ... yadi vā apohanam apoha iti." *AS*., p. 1.

[40] "iti vyutpattyā vijātivyāvṛtti-mātram bāhyam eva vivakṣitam; buddhyākāro vā; ... anya vyāvṛttimātram iti trayaḥ pakṣāh." *Ibid.*

[41] "apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣitatvāt." *Ibid.* vidhi = affirmative statement. Cf. detailed discussion on "Negative Statements", Section G, below.

this is not merely affirmative nor merely negative meaning but an affirmation qualified by the negation of its contradictory.[42]

E. TWO EXTREMES OF THE APOHA VIEW

Notwithstanding this interpretation of *apoha*, the question arises: Are affirmation and negation related in a temporal sequence? Does the affirmation of *A* follow from the exclusion of *not-A*, or *vice versa* does the exclusion of *non-A* follow from the assertion of *A*? There are two conflicting schools of thought: one positivist and the other negativist. The positivist view is that the positive *meaning*, the affirmation of the thing, say, 'book', is primary, and the exclusion of the *other not-book*, the negative *meaning*, is secondary, for the latter follows the former. For instance, all negative judgments, 'A is *not* B', are grounded in the basic knowledge of what the thing *A is*. The very notion *not-A* presupposes the assertion of *A*. This is the view advanced by Śāntarakṣita and is evidently an attempt to refute the charge of negativism[43] directed at the Buddhist position by the Realists.

The negativist view is that the positive *meaning* is secondary, for it is ascertained by the exclusion of *not-A*. It is only by knowing what a thing is *not* that we can cognise what a thing *is*. Thus, according to this interpretation, negation is primary and is followed by the positive *meaning*.[44]

However, Ratnakīrti rejects both these views as 'extremist' and illogical. His argument is that *affirmation* and *negation* are dialectically so related that the two cannot be apprehended in time sequence. He says:

[42] "nāsmābhir apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo 'bhipretaḥ. nāpy anyavyāvrttimātram, kntv anyāpoha-viśiṣṭo vidhih śabdānām arthah." *AS.* (3.6-8). Cp. "śabdo 'rthāntara-vyāvṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āheti." This passage has been ascribed to Dignāga by Dharmakīrti, *PVS.*, p. 251; by Karṇakagomin in *PVST.*, p. 248, and by Prabhāchandra in *PKM.*, p. 436.

[43] Cf. K. K. Raja, "The Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians", *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XVII, pt. 3-4, pp. 14-15.

[44] Ratnakīrti refers to these two opposite views without mentioning names of any Buddhist or non-Buddhist writers. vide., *AS.*, p. (3.9-11).

In the former positivists' view, we do not find any successive stages of grasping of affirmative and then, negative meaning. No one after having understood an affirmative apprehends a negative meaning by *implication*. Nor, conversely, does any one apprehend a distinct positive meaning, after having understood a primary negative meaning.[45]

Hence, for instance, the statement 'know the meaning of the word cow', means 'understand a positive fact as qualified by the negation of all the cases of not-cow'. Both events, affirmation and negation, are simultaneous (tat kāla). The two terms are logically so connected that the negative has an attributive relation to the affirmative.[46] Both are inseparable in time sequence.

Ratnakīrti here seems to have reiterated the original position of *apoha* as it appears in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. We have quoted a passage of Dignāga which supports the interpretation of Ratnakīrti.[47]

F. THE LAW OF OPPOSITION

For the Buddhist thinkers, negation is based on the *a priori* opposition (virodha) of *unique* momentary particular entities. All negations, according to Dharmakīrti,[48] are rooted in Opposition[49] which can be divided into two classes:

(1) Efficient opposition or Incompatibility (sahabhāva-virodha);

(2) Logical opposition or Contradiction (anyonyopalabdhi-parihāra-sthitilakṣaṇa-virodha).

The former is defined in the following passage:

When (one fact has duration (as long as) the sum-total of its causes remains unimpaired and it (then) vanishes as soon as another, (the

[45] *AS.*, p. (3.13-15) "prāthamikasyāpi pratipattikrama-adarśanāt. na hi vidhim pratipadya kascid arthāpattitaḥ paścād apoham avagacchati. apoham vā pratipadya anyāpoḍham."

[46] Cf. *ibid.* (3.17-18): "viśeṣaṇabhūtasyānyāpohasya."

[47] *Supra* note 42.

[48] *PVS.*, pp. 35-37 (ed. G. p. 5ff.).

[49] In translating 'virodha' by Opposition we have followed Stcherbatsky's exposition of the law of contradiction. Cf., *BL.*, Vol. II, p. 187 n. 3. *NB.*, III, 74: "dvividho hi padārthānām virodhaḥ."

opposed), fact appears, it follows that both are incompatible, (or efficiently opposed), just as the sensations of heat and cold.[50]

The second type of opposition is explained as follows:

There is also (opposition between two terms) when their own essence consists in mutual exclusion, as between the (terms) eternal and non-eternal.[51]

Some other instances of the second variety of opposition include such pairs as: reality and unreality, existence and non-existence, affirmation and negation, blue and non-blue.[52] In the first type of opposition, namely incompatibility, two facts exist independently without opposing each other. Their opposition becomes efficient only when they are placed together in one time-space relation. While in the second type of opposition, viz., contradiction, the two opposed facts are so related that neither of the two can be defined or apprehended without excluding the other. The very "essence" (lakṣaṇa) of the one consists in exclusion of the other, e.g., blue and non-blue. The first type of opposition seems to mean negation of terms or entities as can be seen in the eight-fold formulae of

[50] sahabhāva virodha = sahānavasthālakṣaṇa virodha. *PVS.*, p. 35: "aparyantakāranasya bhavato'nyabhāvābhāvād virodhagatiḥ." *NB.*, III, 75: "avikalakāraṇasya ..." (rest is the same), and 76: śītoṣṇasparśavat. Translation, *BL.*, p. 187. See also Karṇakagomin, *PVST.*, pp. 35-36.

[51] *PVS.*, p. 36: "anyonyopalabdhiparihārasthitilakṣaṇatā vā virodho nityānityavat." This reading also agrees with the reading of *NB.*, III, 77: "parasparaparihārasthita-(ti)-lakṣaṇatayāvābhāvābhāvavat." Stcherbatsky's observation thereon is noteworthy. Translation, *BL.*, II, p. 192 n. 2 "... (p. 193) it is clear that in these words we have a definition of the Law of Contradiction, so much discussed in European Logic from Aristoteles through Leibnitz, Kant and Sigwart up to the modern logicians. It is therefore of the highest importance to realise the exact meaning of the Indian view. It will be noticed, first of all, that there is no difference between a contradiction of concepts and a contradiction between judgments, the terms bhāva = vidhi = vastu, Tib. yod-pa = sgrub-pa = dnos-pa being synonymous. The term 'blue' in logic always means the judgment 'this is blue'; it is a synthesis of 'thisness' and 'thatness'; it is contrasted with the mere reflex of the blue (pratibhāsa), an unascertained reflex which has no place in logic. Thus in the quarrel between Aristoteles and Sigwart on the one side, and Kant on the other, the Indian view will fall in line rather with the first party. The contradiction is virtually between the judgments 'this is blue' and 'this is not blue'."

[52] *PVST.*, pp. 37-37, Karaṇakagomin, *passim*; *NBT.*, pp. 69-70.

negative inference explained by Dharmakīrti.[53] The second variety of opposition, *contradiction*, appears to refer to negation of propositions. For the very essence of 'non-blue' presupposes the proposition 'this is blue', and vice-versa. This propositional opposition, however, poses many logical difficulties which are discussed by the Buddhist philosophers under the heading *apoha* or determination = exclusion = differentiation.[54]

Table of Opposition (virodha)


Incompatibility of Efficient opposition = negation of terms or entities (sahabhāva-virodha), e.g., the opposition of the sensations of heat and cold (śītoṣṇasparśavat)	Contradiction or Logical opposition = negation of propositions (anyonyopalabdhi-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇa-virodha), e.g., the opposition of blue and non-blue, existence and non-existence (nīlānīla, bhāvābhāva) affirmation and negation (vidhiniṣedha).

Furthermore, from a purely logical point of view, the Buddhists maintain that every term or proposition is the negation of its own negation (anyāpoha). Even an affirmative proposition entails the exclusion of its negation, and a given proposition is true, if and only if, its contradictory is false. Dignāga explains that a term, for instance, "the blue-lotus" not only excludes the lotuses that are *not* blue but also excludes those blue things which are *not* lotuses.[55] Thus it signifies the exclusion of the non-blue and the non-lotus.[56]

53 Cf., *PVST.*, p. 86; in *NB.*, II, 31, these are elevenfold.
54 Cf., Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 195, n. 2.
55 *PKM.*, p. 436: "Dignāgena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasamarthanārtham 'nilotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivrttiviśiṣṭān arthān āhuḥ' ityuktam." (Dharmakīrti and Karṇakagomin too ascribed this passage to Dignāga, see *PVS.*, pp. 248, 251). See also Karṇakogomin p. 182: "yathānutpalād vyāvṛttā utpalabhedās ta eva punaranyatopyanīlād vyāvṛttimantaḥ pratibhānti", also pp. 260-261.
56 Raja, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

G. NEGATIVE STATEMENTS

Statements are accepted of two kinds: (1) Positive (vidhi), and (2) Negative (niṣedha or pratiṣedha). In Indian logic the negative form is again divided into two: (a) a simple negative (prasajya-pratiṣedha) and (b) negative by implication (paryyudāsa).[57]



[57] It seems that these negative kinds of statements in Indian logic were originally introduced by the Mīmāṃsakas who were primarily concerned with the problems of the correct application of the Vedic texts in the sacrificial ceremonies. Cf., *Jamini Sūtra*, X. VIII, i, 15; *ŚBh.*, pp. 621-631. The Mīmāṃsaka writers were the first to use the terms *prasajya* and *paryyudāsa* in connection to their religious and ritual interpretations of the Vedic negative statements. For instance, the injunctive statement: "One must not kill a Brāhmaṇa" (Dvijam na hanyāt), (cp., "Thou shalt not kill"), defiance of which leads to sin and calamity (aśreya) is to be considered as a pure negation (prasajya). Whereas if the Vedic text reads that "a particular ritual should be performed in a particular ceremony" it implies that the ritual may or may not be performed in some other ceremony but must be performed in that particular instance. See for details *MNP.*, pp. 156ff.; *Saṅkṣepaśāriraka* (*CSS.*), pp. 298ff.; *Arthasaṅgraha* (*CSS*), pp. 170ff.; *Tattvabindu* (Trichinopoly, 1936), pp. 120ff. However, according to grammarians, stress is on the point of construction of the sentence: the *prasajya* is where the negation is essential and the positive element secondary, i.e., where negation applies to the verb (but not to the last member of the negative compound). Where the positive element is essential and the negation secondary is the *paryyudasa*. It is to be understood that this negation applies only to the last member of the negative compound.

The Buddhist logicians, in *apoha*, maintained that every term and proposition is discriminatory. Now this means that the affirmative and the negative are mutually exclusive and so related to each other that the definition of one involves the other. Dharmakīrti said: "That cannot be affirmed, cannot be denied; nor can that be denied which cannot be affirmed".[58] Hence whereas affirmation implies negation, negation presupposes the affirmation.[59]

Now the question arises: if the Buddhists are correct in asserting that the meaning of a word is both affirmative and negative at the same time, then different propositional forms would be superfluous.

The answer to this is that the Buddhists were concerned with the import of the propositions. Karṇakagomin explains: "A sentence expressing an affirmative (judgment) asserts a positive (meaning) primarily (and) negation of its contradictory by implication (arthāt). (2) And (a sentence) expressing a negative (judgment) asserts a negation primarily (and) affirmation of its contradictory by implication. (3) While the sentence expressing 'negation by implication' (paryyudāsa), after denial primarily asserts the presence of a contrary fact. Thus, (among the three forms of statements) there is indeed distinction".[60]

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apradhānyam vidheryatra pratiṣedhe pradhānatā.
prasajya-pratiṣedho'yam kriyayā saha yatra nañ.
pradhānatvam vidheryatra pratiṣedhe'pradhānatā.
paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatrottarapadena nañ.

This is the Śloka 490 in a work called *Sārasvata*, edited by Nava Kishora Kara Sarma 1936 (cf., Renou, *Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit* (Paris, 1957), pp. 202, 230). This reference I owe to Dr. D. Friedman of the University of London.

58 *PVS.*, p. 253: "na hy anvayo' vyāvṛttimato nāpy ananvayino vyārttiḥ".

59 'Not' belongs to the class of "propositional words". Cf. B. Russell, *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1956), pp. 70ff. Strictly speaking negation is always negation of a proposition (upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhi). See D. Sharma, "The Paradox of Negative Judgment and Indian Logic", *Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal*, V, II, pt. 1 (March 1964).

60 *PVST.*, p. 253: "kastarhi vidhi-pratiṣedha-paryudāsavākyānām bhedaḥ? mahānbhedaḥ. vidhāyakam hi vākyam vidhim prādhānyenābhidhāy-ānyaniṣedhakam arthāt. niṣedhakam ca niṣedham prādhānyen-ābhidhāy-ārthād anyavidhānam āha. paryudāsapratipādakan tu vākyam pratiṣedhapūrvakam anyavidhānam prādhānyen āha ity asty eva viśeṣaḥ'iti."

According to this explanation (1) the proposition, 'snow is white', for example, is an affirmation in which the negation of its contradictory, 'snow is black' is implied; (2) the proposition, 'snow is *not* black', is a negation in which the affirmation of 'snow is white' is implied. (3) Negation is implied in the proposition 'Mt. Everest is the *highest* mountain in the world'. Here we assert primarily that Mt. Everest is the highest mountain in the world but we do so by denying the suggestion that there is any other mountain as high as Mt. Everest.

However, it should be noted that the Buddhist theory of 'negative inference' (anupalabdhi),[61] corresponds to the *simple* negation (prasajya), and entails the implicative negation (paryyudasa), whereas, the *apoha* theory corresponds primarily to the negation by *implication.* According to Ratnakīrti, negation by *implication* (paryyudāsa) is found rooted (niyata) in the immediate knowledge of the thing and is therefore commonly applied to both *affirmative* and *simple* negative propositions.[62] This means that logically speaking, there can be neither a pure affirmation, nor a pure negation. This is the reason why 'one does not go and tie a horse or a dog when asked to tie a cow'.[63] *Apoha* is the basis of our discriminatory behaviour in every day life. And *differentiation* is the prime factor of all reflective thinking. Thus, the Buddhist would conclude that it is *differentiation* that is manifested by *words* and *reason,* and apprehended through language and logic.[64]

H. *A PRIORI* PRINCIPLE IN THE DIGNĀGA-DHARMAKĪRTI SYSTEM

A sharp distinction is made between two kinds of knowledge which are called *empirical* and *a priori.* The basis of this distinction is

[61] Cf. D. Sharma, "Epistemological Negative Dialectics of Indian Logic – *Abhāva* versus *Anupalabdhi*", *Indo-Iranian Journal*, IX, 4 (1966).

[62] *AS.*, p. 4.6-7: " paryyudāsarupābhāva-grahaṇantu niyata-svarūpa-samvedanam ubhayoraviśiṣṭam."

[63] "anyathāyadi śabdād arthapratipattikāle kalito na parāpohaḥ, katham anyaparihāreṇa pravṛttiḥ. tato gām vadhāneti codito'śvādīn api vadhniyāt." *Ibid.*, p. 4. 8-10.

[64] "Apohaḥ śabda-liṅgābhyām prakās'yate." *JN.*, p. 201.

found in the way knowledge is obtained. Sometimes knowledge is obtained by observation of the external world via sense-perception and through introspection. In epistemology this is called "empirical knowledge". But when knowledge is obtained by simply *thinking*, it is *a priori*. Its chief exemplifications are seen in logic and mathematics. In order to know that $7 + 9 = 16$ we do not have to take seven, then nine things, put them together and then count the total 'sixteen'. We can know what the sum number is simply by thinking.[65] According to the Kantian definition, as Otto F. Kraushaar explains, "a term applied to all judgments and principles whose validity is independent of all impressions of sense is called *a priori*".[66] Thus, whatever is pure *a priori* is unmixed with anything empirical. In the Kantian view all the necessary conditions of experience, that is time, space, and the categories are *a priori*. And whatever is *a priori* must possess universal and necessary validity.[67]

In the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti school two kinds of knowledge are defined on the basis of their correspondence to two kinds of contents of cognition namely, *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.[68] The former is the extreme point-instant; it is the *thing-in-itself* (svalakṣaṇa), it is the ultimate real, for it alone is efficient. Whatever is causally efficient is real.[69] Reality (sat), being (bhāva), and thing (vastu) are different names for the same efficient momentary *svalakṣaṇa*. Its opposite is fictional, non-efficient. Whether it be pure fiction or productive imagination, all thought construction is non-empirical and thus is not the object of observation, of the sense-perception.

65 Cf. A. C. Ewing, *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1958) (fourth impression), p. 26. Also Clarence I. Lewis, *Mind and the World Order. Outline of a Theory of Knowledge* (New York, Dover Publications, 1956), pp. 195-229.

66 *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Iowa, Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1959), p. 16.

67 *Ibid.* We may here note, however, that many present philosophers do not subscribe to the Kantian theory of *a priori*. For further study reader is referred to S. Korner, *The Philosophy of Mathematics* (= *The Science Library*) (New York, Harper & Row).

68 "mānam dvividham meya-dvaividhyāt", *PVP.*, p. 169 (III. 1).

69 "arthakriyā-samartham yat tad atra paramārtha-sat. anyat samyrti-sat proktam te sva-sāmānyalakṣaṇe." Dharmakīrti, *PVP.*, p. 175 (III.3).

In this view, only this *present*, *here and now*, – only the atomic-event is considered *real*. Thus all past and future, mental, notional, general or universal constructions belonging to language and logic are different from the *real*. So are all relations that are mere logical concepts. Reality is ascribed to the moment of flux of the physical world.[70] Corresponding to these two kinds of objects, real and formal, empirical and conceptual, knowledge is of two kinds. It is either immediate or mediate; it is either a means of grasping the momentary atomic-event (kṣaṇika) or it is a source of apprehending formal facts, the constructed world of the mind. The immediate one is the simple sense-stimulas called *pratyakṣa*, while the second one is the indirect or mediate; it is conception, termed *anumāna* or inference.[71]

The first one is a passive reflex or *pratibhāsa* and the second one is a conditioned reflex or *kalpanā*.[72] The latter is also described as a constructed cognition or *adhyavasāya*. The difference between the two is explained by Ratnakīrti as follows:

An object of knowledge is either of two kinds: 1) directly grasped and 2) logically constructed. Whatever is reflected (in the intellect through sense-object contact) is directly grasped. But that which, even though not being grasped empirically, forms the basis of our propositional attitudes is logically constructed.[73]

The *adhyavasāya* type of knowledge is that whose validity is independent of all sense impressions. It is, thus, a logical law which

[70] Cf. E. Frauwallner, *WZKM.*, Vol. 37, p. 275, and Vol. 40, p. 63; Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, Vol. I, p. 69; Satkari Mookerjee, *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* (Calcutta, 1935), *passim.*

[71] Some later Buddhist logicians declared Inference and logic as illusion "bhrāntam anumānam". *NBT.*, p. 12; *Tattva-Saṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita (Baroda, 1926), p. 274.24. But this does not tally with the original view of *anumāna as pramāṇa*. According to Dharmakīrti, the definition of *pramāṇa* is, 'non-discrepent valid cognition' pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam". *PVP.*, 3 (II. 1) Since it is accepted as a *pramāṇa* it would be self-contradictory for the Buddhist to regard it as an illusion *bhrānta*. However, it might have been due to the influence of the Buddhist and the Vedantic theology that the logicians made qualifying statements to the effect that from the standpoint of ultimate reality 'paramārtha-sat', Inference and the world of logic were mere illusions.

[72] Cf. *RN.*, pp. 60, 67-68; also *BL.*, vol. II, p. 71.

[73] "dvividho vijñānānām viṣayaḥ. grāhyo' dhyavaseyaśca. pratibhāsamāno grāhyaḥ. agṛhito'pi pravṛttiviṣayo' dhyavaseyaḥ." *RN.*, p. 124.

guides the intellect and is not dependent on the empirical sense-data.[74]

In explaining the inferential aspect of the *apoha* view of *meaning*, the Buddhist evokes the principle of *adhyavasāya*. It is said that the knowledge of the particular thing (*A*) is not possible without being determined by the exclusion of "all other things" (*not-non-A*).[75] Now, since "all other things" or *non-A*, refers to anything in the universe except *A*, the cognition of *non-A* is a humanly impossible feat; for all the cases of *non-A* scattered all over the universe cannot be grasped empirically. They can, however, be inferred. This is the business of Inference, otherwise *anumāna* would become purposeless.[76]

Furthermore, the Buddhist, in opposition to the Realist's view of relation, emphatically denies that there can be any *real* thing indissolubly connected with other things, thus providing the logical *ground* of anything. And since relation is not a sense-datum, the relationship of *reason* and consequent does not depend on the external world. The relationship of attribute (dharma) and subject (dharmin) is a creation of the intellect. The ideas, thus, obey "laws of connexion" not imposed by empirical things, but by the function of our own thought and thus are *a priori* in character.[77]

Application of the *a priori* principle seems to have occurred in India at the time of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The *apoha* theory and the Buddhist view of *relation* and *inference* are so intrinsically connected with this principle that without it, the Buddhist cannot resolve many logical difficulties in his system; nor can he defend himself from the Realist critism. The application of the principle of *adhyavasāya* (analogously to the post-Kantian employment of the *a priori* in Western philosophy), gave a new impetus to the investiga-

[74] Cf. *RN*., p. 85 and *AS*. (17.3-10). Ewing's explanation of *a priori* is somewhat similar to the Buddhist view of *adhyavasāya*. Cp. Ewing, *op. cit*., p. 197.
[75] "sakalātadrūpa parāvṛttam vastu-mātram sākṣād asphuraṇāt pratyakṣasya grāhyo viṣayo mā bhūt." *RN*., p. 68. Also *AS*. (6.11-15); *JN*., p. 208.
[76] Cf. *RN*., p. 124: "tatrāsarvajñe'numātari sakala-vipakṣa-pratibhāsābhāvān na grāhyatayāvipakṣo viṣayo vaktavyaḥ, sarvānumānoccheda prasaṅgāt, sarvatra sakala-vipakṣa-pratibhāsābhāvāt."
[77] vikalpa = adhyavasāya = *a priori*. cf. Keith, *Atomism*, p. 102; Stcherbatsky, *BL*., vol. II, p. 49 n. 3.

tion of problems of knowledge and logic in India. It may be considered as one of the most significant contribution of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti school.

I. REALIST ARGUMENTS AGAINST APOHA

The main opposition to the *apoha* theory came from the Realist philosophers, namely Trilocana, Vācaspatimiśra, Udayana and Bhāsarvajña of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the Mīmāṃsā school. Ratnakīrti mentions them by name and, citing their views as *pūrva-pakṣa*, replies to them in the *Apohasiddhiḥ.*[78]

According to the Realists, reality (padārtha) is two-fold: Existence (bhāva) and non-Existence (abhāva), and therefore language too consists of two types of words, namely, positive and negative. Negation is said to be the *meaning* of negative words whereas Existence *bhāva* is expressed by positive words. Udayana defines Existence as that which is not expressible by negative letters.[79] All such terms as exclusion, separation, differentiation, or limitation, etc., according to the Realists, are in essence negative, for their function leads to negative judgmental behaviour.[80] Hence, to say that every word and statement is expressive of a negative and a positive *meaning*, and concurrently so, is contrary to all rules of our language experiences.

The Realists believe that anything which can be thought of and named must have a corresponding physical existence. Thus for them all possible relations, Inherence (samvāya), Universal (sāmānya) and even non-Existence (abhāva) are real ontological entities (padārthas). For the Realists, therefore, the statement, for example, "I see *no book* here on the table", is a perceptual cognition which refers to a real *absence*. It is not merely a denial of the

[78] Cf. *AS.*, (4.11-13), (8.5-6), (7.14-15), (10.17-19), (9.2-4), (11.8-9), (14.20), (13.17-19).

[79] Cp. *Lak.*, p. 1.

[80] Problem of negative words and their *meaning* has been discussed with greater details in my article: "The Paradox of Negative Judgment and Indian Logic", *Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal*, Vol. II, pt. 1 (March 1964).

presence of a thing in a given locus, a mere logical expression, but a real fact. *Abhāva* is as much a physical object of knowledge as any positive object, a cow, a book, etc, is. It is a *thing* (vastu) with many of its kinds (bhedas).[81] For the Realists, thus, *meaning* of a word or category (padārtha), or reality or thing-ness (vastutā) are synonymous; every cognition has its corresponding object in the external world. Having said this much about the Realist attitude towards negative facts, let us examine some of their arguments against *apoha*.

Against the Buddhist view of a class as a grouping of counter-correlatives (*non-A* or *non-cow*),[82] it is argued that since the *reason* (hetu) is said to be merely its being the "negation of the thing (*A*)", the thing (*cow*) itself, is *a priori* ascertained, with reference to which we can cognise a case of *non-A*. And since the thing is *a priori* ascertained, there is no point in knowing cases of the other, the *non-A's*. What then, is the necessity of *apoha*? For its purpose is contended to be the ascertainment of the particular thing *A* by the "exclusion of all that which is *non-A*".[83]

The cognition of *cow* is determined by the exclusion of *non-cow*, and vice-versa, the cognition of *non-cow* is dependent on the cognition of the *cow*. Thus, the very term *apoha* cannot be defined as the "differentiation from the other *non-A*", because the very definition of a universal *non-A* involves cognition of *A*.[84]

Further it is questioned whether it is the individual or the universal which is to be cognised in the "exclusion of *non-cow*", that

[81] "na ca 'vastuna ete syur bhedās tenāsya vastutā." *Śl. Vārt.*, abhāva chapter, verse 8. Also see an excellent exposition of *abhāva* by B. Faddegon, *The Vaiśesika System* (Amsterdam, Johannes Muller, 1918), pp. 119-121; Keith, *Atomism*, p. 180; Ingalls, *Materials*, pp. 38 and 54.
[82] See *AS.*, pp. 11-12; *PVS.*, pp. 319 and 374.
[83] "atha gopratiṣedha eva vargikaraṇa-hetur iṣyate hanta' tarhi gauḥ pūrvasiddha eṣitavyāḥ yatpratiṣedhena agāvaḥ pratiyeran, pūrvasiddhe ca gavi labdhe kim agobhiḥ kim tad apohena prayojanam." *Nyāya-Mañjari* of Jayantabhaṭṭa, ed. with notes by Paṇḍit Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Sukla (= *Kashi Sanskrit Series*) (Benares, 1936) (*NM.*), p. 278.
[84] "atha go-sāmāyam ago-pratiṣedhena siddhyati tada dustaram itaretarāśrayatvam agoniṣedhena gosiddhiḥ gosiddhyā ca' goniṣedha-siddhir iti, tasmād apohasyaiva nirūpayitum aśakyatvāt." Also cf. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Śl. Vārt.*, apohavāda, verses, 1-5, 65 and 83-84.

is, are individual horses, elephants, etc., or the classes of horses, elephants, etc., to be understood by the term *non-cow*?

For notwithstanding the Buddhist's definition of the individual as the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa) and the point-instant (kṣaṇika), evidently the individual is not expressed by the term *non-A*, for it has no body or form and besides it has been defined as inexpressible by words. And if by *non-cow* the advocate of the *apoha* theory means the universals which are excluded from the *cow*, then, following the Buddhist definition of the universal as "mere exclusion of the counter-correlate", it means "the exclusion of the exclusion itself"; that is, universal = apoha and apoha = absence. Then, how can one exclude the exclusion? That is, there will be negation of the negation? Isn't it the case, then, that double negation is equivalent to a single affirmation? Thus, logically speaking, the Realists maintain, the Buddhist must concede that the *meaning* of word is in fact affirmation of a positive entity only.[85]

Moreover, if according to the apohists every word is differentiative, then, a language need not necessarily have negative letters, say, 'not', 'no', etc.? Then, a question arises, for instance, in a statement, '*X* is *not* here', about the meaning of the term 'not'? Then, too, is not *apoha* impossible in cases of prefixes, suffixes and such words as 'all', 'thus', 'and', 'number', etc. And furthermore, what is the meaning of a verb, for example, 'to cook', in the statement, 'he cooks', etc., where a word expresses only a certain action, and does not affirm or deny any object. Thus *apoha* as a theory of meaning has to be limited to just those words that are strictly names of universals. And if the Buddhist agrees to this position, then, he cannot oppose the view that universal words denote external objects or that words are universal names of the external objects. Thus, the apohists have to agree that a word denotes a *universal* which is either an *a priori* cognitive fact, or a judgmental fact based on the cognitive aspect of the external reality, but the

[85] "api ca'śvādayaḥ sāmānya-rūpeṇa vāpohyeran viśeṣātmanā vā, na viśeṣātmanā tad anaṅgatvād aśabda-vācyatvācca, sāmānyātmanā tu teṣām apy apoharūpatvād abhāvatvam, katham cābhāvasyaiva abhāvaḥ kriyate karaṇe vā pratiṣedha-dvayayogād vidhir avatiṣṭhate iti vidhirūpaḥ śabdārthaḥ syāt." *NM.*, p. 279. Cf. *Śl. Vārt.*, *apoha*, verses, 62-64.

universal alone is the *meaning*. The view that *differentiation* is the meaning of word is a mere expediency for the Buddhist, but logically it is not necessary.[86]

J. FORMAL STANDPOINT OF THE APOHIST

The Sanskrit term *artha* is as ambiguous as its English equivalent *meaning*. The term *artha* is used in three senses:[87] (1) intention or purpose, (2) cause or means, and (3) the external object of the senses. The Realists are inclined to take *artha* in its third sense only,[88] whereas, the conceptualist apohists prefer its other meanings.

According to the apohist view *meaning* in its logical aspect can only be a mental phenomena, for it arises in the intellect and is based on our propositional attitude. It is in fact the instrument of the act of reference, rather than the object of reference. And thus there is only a creative mental function contained in the law of *differentiation* (apoha).

The Realists' arguments against *apoha* evidently stem from their naive assumption that only actually existing things can have determinate objective character. It is, however, not very difficult to shew that the world of knowledge, the world about there is true knowledge, cannot be limited to empirical objects but it must take account all their possible relations, functions, and arrangements. Take, for instance, propositions such as: *Carbon burns*, *Ice melts 32°F.*, *Metals conduct heat and electricity*, or the Buddhist examples

[86] "pratiṣedhavācinām ca nañādiśabdānām kā vārttā atra na bhavatīti neti ko'rthaḥ upasarga-nipātānām ca katham apoha-viṣayatvam ākhyāta-śabdānām ca pacatityādinām apoho durupapādaḥ nāmnām eva jātiśabdānām apohāviṣayatvam iṣyate yeśām bhavanto jātivācitvam tadvācitvam vā pratipadyante iti cet tato'nyeṣām tarhi kā vārttā, bāhyārtha-vācitve jātiśabdeṣu ko dveṣaḥ nirālambanatve jñānāmśālambanatve vā jātiśabdānām api tadevāstu kim apohavāda-pramādena." *NM.*, p. 279. Also cp. *Śl. Vārt.*, *apoha*, verses, 32-34, 38, and 139-143, 146. nirālambanatva = being *a priori* cognitive fact. jñānāmśālambanatva = being a judgmental fact based on the cognitive aspect of the external reality.

[87] Cf. M. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Oxford, 1960), (new ed.).

[88] "artha iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu." vide, *Nyāya-koṣa* of Bhīmāchārya Jhalakikar (Bombay, Government Central Book Depot, 1893) (2nd ed.), p. 63.

red-hot-iron-ball and *ever constantly regenerated hair*. These all refer to classes of possibilities of the ideally continuous or recurrent existences called *carbon*, *ice*, *metal*, *hot-iron ball*, or *growing hair*. Now whatever really exists is only one of an indefinite number of possibilities. And since the *real* is only a point-instant moment (kṣaṇa) "passing from the future which is not yet to the past which no longer is", logical *meaning* or *apoha* can be conceived as "ruling out what is absolutely impossible and thus determining the field of what, in the absence of empirical knowledge is abstractly possible".[89]

To the apohist, the function of both language and inference (or *term* (śabda) and *reason* (liṅga)) is basically the same, determinative and conclusive. It is said that *apoha* is manifested in '*śabda* and *liṅga*.[90] Thence, it seems appropriate to interpret *apoha* as a logical function. The definition of logic, in the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system, often seems to be the same as the definition of meaning or apoha.[91]

In rejecting the Realists' view of *meaning* and their mis-conception of *apoha*, the apohist's *formal* and conceptualist view of the theory may be summarised here as follows. The basis of *meaning* is conception. It has three characteristics: (1) firstly it entails predicability of being or not-being, *is* or *is not*, or true or false with reference to other conceptions; (2) second, its form is determinative, and (3) third, it resembles the external object. Now none of these three characteristics are found in the cognition of the external thing. Predication *is* or *is not* is not necessary. For when the thing is already cognised, it is futile to predicate '*A* is *A*'. For with reference to the thing cognised itself it is futile to assert that the thing *is*. Nor can it be predicated negatively, for there is no other object in perception with reference of which it can be negated in the proposition, '*A* is not ...'.

Determinativeness cannot be assigned to the external object.

[89] Cf. Cohen and Nagel's statement about the function of logic. *An Introduction to Logic* (London, Routledge Paperback, 1963), p. 21.
[90] "apohaḥ śabda-liṅgābhyām prakāśyate." *JN.*, p. 201.
[91] Cf. *BL.*, Vol. I, p. 459.

For the proposition, 'it is *not* a horse, it is cow', does not arise in the perception of the body of the thing 'cow'. That belongs to conception. Thus, the *meaning* of the word 'cow', for instance, is the conception as what A *is* and what A *is not*. From this it follows that meaning is *differentiation*. Otherwise the law of Opposition[92] will not operate, and in an indeterminative state of cognition, things are not truely known, because they are not determinately cognised. But when the things are cognised they are apprehended distinctly by their names as what they are as differentiated from what they are not.

Moreover, since words (or names) are repeated, their meaning, in essence, can only be conceptual, and not the actual thing. For every time a word is used the actual thing cannot repeatedly be presented to the senses.[93] An actual object may completely be removed from our empirical limitations, say, a dinosaur, and yet the *meaning* resting in the conception of the word d-i-n-o-s-a-u-r is a valid ground for our propositional attitude.

The Realists' objection about the meaning of such logical words[94] as *all*, *and*, *thus*, *not*, etc. (Sanskrit: sarvam, ca, evam, iti, nañ ...) and prefixes and suffixes, in fact, raises no difficulty for the conceptualist apohist. On the contrary, an analysis of these adds support to the nominalist position. What objective *meaning* can the Realists assign to such terms? The Realists may appear to hold their ground when dealing with questions of objective words, such as, cow, horse, book, etc. But with reference to logical words,

[92] Cf. above section on "The Law of Opposition."

[93] "vikalpabhūmir artho vikalpāntara-sannidhāpita-bhāvābhāvākṣepi niyatarūpo bāhya-sādṛśca pratīyate, na ca idam rūpa-trayam api bāhye vastuni yujyate, bāhyasya hi vastunaḥ svarupenāvagatasya na vikalpāntāropanīte-bhāva-sambandha upapadyate vaiyārthyāt, nāpy ābhāva-sambandho vipratiṣedhāt, niyata-rūpatā ca vikalpa-viṣayasya gaur eva nāśva ity evam avagamyamāna vastv antara vyavacchedam antareṇa nāvakalpate iti balād vyavaccheda-viṣayatvam, anyathā niyam-pariccheda-asambhavāt sandigdham ca vastu na gṛhyate, evam bāhyavastu-viṣayatve ca nirāste vikalpānām ekasyārtha-svabhāvasy eti nyāyena paunaruktyād abāhya-viṣayatvam nyāyyam, abāhyāntar āropitam rūpam tac ca bāhyavadaca bhāsate ...". *NM.*, p. 281. Also cp Ratnakīrti, *AS.*, p. 9.

[94] For the distinction of the object and logical words, cf. Bertrand Russell, *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1965) (6th imp.) pp. 163-164.

it is only the apohist or the nominalist who can resolve the problem of the *meaning* of *word*.[95]

It is very significant to observe that the Realists do not hesitate to posit any number of relations and entities as the factual counterparts of their static concept of physics. In Realism one is always willing to sacrifice logic rather than become paradoxical. It is maintained that even between *not-A* and its locus there exists a factual *unique relation* called 'qualifier-qualificand'.[96] Thus the Realists understand only one type of *complementary* relation which actually exists between two entities;[97] whereas the Buddhist speaks only of a formal relation, relation of two terms, not of entities. The former, for instance, exemplified *relation* as existing between the staff and the staff-holder (daṇḍa and daṇḍin), whereas the latter refers to logical pairs, blue and not-blue, existence and not-existence, affirmation and negation (nilānīla, bhāvābhāva, vidhiniṣedha).[98]

Now the Realist position might be stated as follows: "The word 'cow' means all that is true of cow". But as a definition this is circular, for the word "cow" occurs in the defining phrase. In fact, if the Realist were right, no word could begin to have a meaning, since we should need to know in advance the meanings of all other words in order to ascertain all the properties of what the word designates.

But such is not the problem for the apohist. The Buddhist's position might be stated as follows: "The word 'cow' means all that is true of not-non-cow". All its unknown properties can be inferred from the term 'not-non-cow'. One need not to know each and every case of not-cow and all possible relations and arrangements of cow and not-cow. If enough is known about a thing to distinguish it by a name from all other things, then, the apohist maintains, all its properties can be inferred.[99]

[95] Cp. W. V. Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1960), on Nominalism and Realism, p. 237-238.
[96] "viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇatābhāva-sambandha", For the Realist's view of this relation see an excellent exposition by Ingalls, *Materials*, pp. 40-41.
[97] See Vācaspati, *AS.* (10.17-19) (11.4-7).
[98] *AS.*, *passim*, *PVST.*, Karṇakagomin, p. 121; *PVP.*, p. 573.
[99] *JN.*, p. 201. Also cf. Russell's discussion of the Hegelian position, *HWP.*, pp. 744-745.

TEXT

TRANSCRIBED SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION WITH NOTES

APOHASIDDHIḤ

namaḥ Śrī Lokanāthāya.
apohaḥ śabdārtho nirucyate.

nanu ko'yam apoho nāma? kimidam anyasmād apohyate, asmādvā anyad apohyate; asmin vānyad apohyata iti vyutpattyā vijātivyāvṛttam bāhyam eva vivakṣitam; buddhyākāro vā; yadi vā apohanam apoha ity anya-vyāṛttimātram iti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ.
(1.8.) na tāvadādimau pakṣau, apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣitatvāt; antimo'py asaṅgataḥ pratītibādhitatvāt; tathāhi parvvatoddeśe vahnirastīti śābdī pratītirvvidhirūpamevollikhantī lakṣyate; nānagnir nabhavatīti nivṛttimātramāmukhayantī. yacca
(1.13) pratyakṣabādhitam na tatra sādhanāntarāvakāśa ity atiprasiddham.
(1.15) atha yadyapi nivṛttim aham pratyemīti na vikalpah. tathāpi nivṛttapadārthollekha eva nivṛtty ullekhaḥ. na hy anantarbhāvitaviśeṣaṇapratītir viśiṣṭapratītiḥ.
(2.1) tato yathā sāmānyam aham pratyemīti vikalpābhāve'pi

[1] Prof. Brough's suggested translation is: "The meaning of a term" is defined to be "Discrimination".
[2] Cf. *PVST.*, Karṇakagomin, p. 114; 'kalpitaścākāro' pohāśrita-tvād apoha ucyate. apohyate' neneti vā. anyanivṛttimātram tv arthād ākṣiptam apohanamapoha ity ucyate. svalakṣaṇam tv apohyate' sminnity apoha ucyate.' Contrary to the Realists Nyāya and Vaiśeṣikas, and the Mīmāmsakas, the Buddhists do not admit the universal or class (ākāra) as a real category (padārtha). A Universal, they say, is a logical concept (imagined or kalpita), grounded on the exclusion of a common-counter correlate. For instance, with reference to a cow, horse, dog, camel, lions, etc. belong to one class 'non-cow'. cp. Ludwig Whittgenstein "5.5303 Roughly speaking; to say of *two* things that they are identical with itself is to say nothing", *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (eighth imp. London, 1960), p. 139.
[3] pratīti.
[4] Inference is primarily based on perception.
[5] antarbhāvita.

APOHASIDDHIḤ

Salutation to The Master of The Universe, Śrīlokanātha.

The meaning of the term 'Apoha' is to be defined (below).[1] (The question is): What is meant by the term *apoha* 'Differentiation'? (There are three possible interpretations). If the etymological sense is taken: (1). A is differentiated from *non-A* (B); or *non-A* (B) from *A*; or (2). B is differentiated out in the midst of *A* then what is intended by a term is simply *A*; either the external object or the mental concept separated from (the class of)[2] *non-A* or else (3). 'Differentiation' is denial (and thus) is mere exclusion of *non-A*. These are the three possible views. (1.8). But it neither the first nor the second (view obtains) for it is, indeed, an affirmation which is intended by the term *apoha*. And the last (third) view is also unsatisfactory, since it is contradicted by perception and ordinary understanding.[3] Thus the understanding of the proposition "There is fire on the mountain" develops on the delineation of something in the affirmative form and not on a purely negative statement: "there is not non-fire".

(1.13). And it is a well known fact that what is contrary to perception cannot be justified by some other means (such as an inferential argument).[4]

(1.15). (The Realist). You (the Buddhist) may now say: "Although there is no judgment of the form 'I perceive negation (absence)', still, (there is) an impression of the thing-negated, (in the locus). For there is no qualified perception which does not imply the perception of the qualifier (at least) in its conceptual form".[5]

(2.1). Thus, although there is no judgment of the form 'I perceive a universal', the knowledge of a judgment which arises the im-
sādhāraṇākāraparisphuraṇāt vikalpabuddhiḥ sāmānyabuddhiḥ

pareṣām; tathā nivṛttapratyayākṣiptā nivṛttibuddhir apohapratītivyavahāram ātanotīti cet?

(2.6) nanu sādhāraṇākāraparisphuraṇe vidhirūpatayā yadi sāmānyabodhavyavasthā; tat kim āyātam asphuradabhāvākāre cetasi nivṛttipratītivyavasthāyāḥ.

(2.8-9) tato nivṛttim aham pratyemīty evamākārābhāve'pi nivṛtty ākārasphuraṇam yadi syāt, ko nāma nivṛttipratītisthitim apalapet.

(2.10-11) anyathā'sati pratibhāse tatpratītivyavahṛtir iti gavākārepi cetasi turagabodha ity astu.

(2.12-16) atha viśeṣaṇatayā antarbhūtā nivṛttipratītir ity uktam, tathāpi yady agavāpoḍha itīdṛśākāro vikalpas tadā viśeṣaṇatayā tadanupraveśo bhavatu, kintu gaur iti pratītiḥ. tadā ca satopi nivṛttilakṣaṇasya tatrānutkalanāt; katham tat pratītivyavasthā.

(2.16-17) athaivam matiḥ.

(2.17-19) yadvidhirūpam sphuritam tasya parāpoho'py astīti tatpratītir ucyate. tathāpi sambandhamātram apohasya vidhireva sākṣānnirbhāsī.

[6] Cp., Dharmakīrti, *PVS.*, p. 132 (I.54).

[7] ātanoti.

[8] 'cetasi' seems to suggests a passive mental impression as opposed to active impression 'bodha.' – J. Brough.

[9] sphuritam.

pression of a common classcharacter is called by other (philosophers) the knowledge of a universal;[6] and similarly, (the Buddhist argues), the knowledge of negation which is projected by the perception of things-negated, makes possible[7] our talking about the perception of 'Differentiation'.

(2.6). But surely (the Realist objects), if the status of a knowledge (or configuration) of a universal rests on the impression of a common class-character which appears in the shape of an affirmation (a positive entity), we may well ask: What is it that arises in the mind in the case of the configuration which is the perception of negation when there is no impression of a class-character of an absence?

(2.8-9). Thus, although there is no class (of judgments) of the form, 'I perceive negation', if there were really an impression of a class-character 'negation', no-one would deny the existence (*Gestalt*?) of perception of negation.

(2.10-11). But if, on the other hand, you (the Buddhist) maintain that even when there is no mental impression of X, we can talk about the perception of X; then, (the Realist objects), when a class-concept of a cow is present in the mind[8] the resulting judgment could well be that of a horse.

(2.12-16). As for your (the Buddhist) suggestion that the apprehension of negation may be contained (in the perception of the thing-negated) as a qualifier, nonetheless, if the judgment is of a form such as 'that which is differentiated from non-cow', then, we admit that the negation comes in afterwards as a qualifier, but the actual perception is the positive (affirmation) 'cow'. And since at that time, (in the perception of a cow), there is no awareness of that (the qualifier whose character is negation – even though such a qualifier, is, in fact, in existence – how can we talk of *Gestalt* of 'the apprehension of negation'?

(2.16-17). So then, the situation is as follows:

(2.17-19). That which is envisaged[9] as a positive entity also entails the exclusion of what is other, and this is called (by you the Budhist) the apprehension of negation' (Differentiation). Nevertheless, it is only the positive entity *A* in the exclusion of *non-A* (X) which reflects the direct sense perception (and thus the apprehension of differentiation is) a mere relation.

(2.19) api caivam adhyakṣasyāpy apohaviṣayatvam anivāryam.
(3.1) viśeṣato vikalpādekavyāvṛttollekhino'khilānyavyāvṛttam īkṣamāṇasya.
(3.2-4) tasmād vidhyākārāvagrahād adhyakṣavadvikalpasyāpi vidhiviṣayatvameva nānyāpohaviṣayatvam iti katham apohaḥ śabdārtho ghuṣyate.
(3.5) atrābhidhīyate.
(3.6-8) nāsmābhir apohaśabdena vidhireva kevalo'bhipretaḥ. nāpy anyavyāvṛttimātram, kintv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ.
(3.8) tataśca na praty ekapakṣopanipātidoṣāvakāśaḥ.
(3.9-10) yattu goḥ pratītau na tadātmāparātmeti sāmarthyād apohaḥ paścānniścīyata iti vidhivādinām matam;
(3.11) anyāpohapratītau vā sāmarthyāt anyāpoḍho'vadhāryyate iti pratiṣedhavādinām matam.
(3.12) tad asundaram.
(3.13-14) prāthamikasyāpi pratipattikramādarśanāt. na hi vidhim pratipadya kaścid arthāpattitaḥ paścād apoham avagacchati;
(3.15) apoham vā pratipadyānyāpoḍham;

[10] adhyakṣa. Cp. below p. 6.10. where the Buddhist rejoins and Ratnakīrti uses the general term for perception 'pratyakṣa.'
[11] Lit., p. 2.19. "Further, it is undeniable that in the same sense, the object of 'Differentiation' also belongs to sense-perception." That is when the thing is perceived, its relation – a separate entity according to the Realists, is also perceived. But, for the Buddhists 'relation' is not an entity but a logical synthesis (adhyavasāya = vikalpa) and therefore cannot be perceived by sense-contact. Cf. below, (6.9-10) and (6.11-12).
[12] viśeṣata ... ikṣamāṇasya.
[13] vikalpa = adhyavasāya; cf *RN.*, p. 67, and pp. 130-131.
[14] Dharmakīrti also in his *PVS.*, 251, quotes Dignāga in support of this view. "śabdo' rthāntara-vyāvṛtti-viśiṣṭāneva bhāvānāheti." A term denotes only positive entities qualified by the exclusion of others. Karṇakagomin in his commentary on *PV.* p. 248 explicitly ascribed this passage to Dignāga. See also pp. 114, 128-129 of the same. *PKM.*, p. 436, too ascribes this to Dignāga.
[15] Sundara: literally means beautiful, appealing.
[16] K. K. Raja observes that Ratnakīrti here "rejects Śāntarakṣita's view that a word conveys a positive meaning first, and a negative meaning later by logical implication". – "The Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians", *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XVII, part 3-4, p. 15. For Śāntarakṣita's view see p. 14 *ibid.*
[17] arthāpattiḥ.

(2.19). Further, it is undeniable that – in the same sense – (the function of) sense-perception[10] is also differentiative.[11]
(3.1). (For example). When a thing is perceived as a particular,[12] from the constructed reasoning (vikalpāt) there arises the awareness of exclusion of all other things (x) by the awareness of *the* excluded (particular) one.
(3.2-4). Hence, indeed, the object of (pure) mental judgmental construction[13] is also a positive entity, just as in perception (it is) the positive entity which is to be cognized through the perception of (its) class-character (ākāra, a common mental image). The object (of a mental construction) is not the exclusion of *non-A*. (The Realist on these grounds asks): How can then the meaning of a term be declared (by the Buddhists) (to be) 'Differentiation'?
(3.5). (The Buddhist). To this our answer is as follows:
(3.6-8). By the term 'Differentiation' what is intended is not merely a positive entity (*A*); nor merely exclusion of (the other) *non-A*, but the meaning of the term is the positive thing (*A*) qualified by the exclusion of the other (*non-A*).[14]
(3.8). And thus, (in this Buddhist definition), there is no scope for criticism on the part (of all those who) indirectly hold different views (of Apoha).
(3.9-10). (There are two conflicting interpretations of Apoha). The positive view is: "The perception of a cow does not involve (cognition of) others in addition to the cow itself and therefore 'Differentiation' (cow and non-cow) is a secondary judgment based upon the force of the (primary affirmative) perception of cow".
(3.11). And the negativist view is: "The (distinct) positive thing (*A* differentiated from *non-A* is understood (as the secondary meaning) based on the force of the cognition of negation of the other (*non-A*) (which is the primary meaning of the term)".
(3.12). This extremism (of views) is not good.[15]
(3.13-14). In the former (positivists' view), we do not find any successive stages of grasping (of affirmative and negative) meaning. No one apprehends a negative meaning,[16] after having understood an affirmative meaning by logical implication.[17]
(3.15). Nor, conversely, does any one apprehend a distinct positive meaning, after having understood a (primary) negative meaning.

(3.16) tasmād goḥ pratipattir iti anyāpoḍhapratipattir ucyate.
(3.17-18) yadyapi cānyāpoḍhaśabdānullekha uktaḥ. tathāpi nāpratipattireva viśeṣaṇabhūtasyānyāpohasya;
(3.19-20) agavāpoḍha eva gośabdasya niveśitatvāt. yathā nīlotpale niveśitād indīvaraśabdānnilotpala pratītau tatkāla eva nīlimasphuraṇam anivāryyam;
(4.1-3) tathā gośabdādapy agavāpoḍhe niveśitāt gopratītau tulyakālam eva viśeṣaṇatvāt ago'pohasphuraṇam anivāryyam.
(4.4-6) yathā pratyakṣasya prasahya[a] rūpābhāvagrahaṇamabhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktireva. tathā vidhivikalpānāmapi tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśaktirevābhāvagrahaṇam abhidhīyate.
(4.7) paryyudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇantu niyatasvarūpasamvedanam ubhayoraviśiṣṭam;
(4.8-10) anyathā yadi śabdād arthapratipattikāle kalito na parāpohaḥ; katham anyaparihāreṇa pravṛttiḥ. tato gām vadhāneti codito'śvādīnapi vadhnīyāt.
(4.11-13) yadapy avocad Vācaspatiḥ; jātimatyo vyaktayaḥ; vikalpānām śabdānāñca gocarāḥ; tāsāñca tadvatīnām rūpam atajjātīyaparāvṛttam ity arthatastad avagater na gām badhāneti codito'śvādīn badhnāti.

[a] Read: prasajya. 'prasahya' is an apparent error.
[18] viśeṣaṇabhūtasyānyāpohasya.
[19] prasahya. Read: prasajya. The author distinguishes between the three types of judgment, namely, two negative – *prasajyapratiṣedha* and *paryyudāsa*, and one affirmative – *vidhi*. Cf. *JN.*, p. 205.
[20] i.e., 'anupalabdhi' or non-perception. Negative inference in Buddhist logic.
[21] (...) the passage is extremely difficult. The use of the phrase "anuṣṭhānadāna" or rites and charity, indicates religious tendencies of Ratnakīrti and his teacher Jñānaśrī (cf. *JN.*, p. 205). But in the present logical context I find it difficult to understand the passage clearly. However, it might indicate the origin of three types of statements relating to the problem of interpretation of the Vedic texts belonging to the Mīmāṃsā system.
[22] paryyudāsa = negation by implication.
[23] samvedana.
[24] Cp. Vācaspatimiśra, *NVTT.* (Vizianagaram edition) p. 340. 23-27; Translation by Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, Vol. II, p. 418.
[25] Vācaspatimiśra (C. 976), the author of the *Nyāya-vārttikatātparyatīkā* (*NVTT.*) who criticized the Buddhist theory of Apoha. Subsequently, Ratnakīrti, following his teacher Jñānaśrī's *Apohaprakaraṇa*, refuted again the Naiyāyikas' charges against the Buddhist theory. Cf. A. Thakur, *RN.*, Introduction, p. 27.
[26] artha or the meaning – the objective thing. (4.15-17).

(3.16). Hence, the statement "understanding of the word cow" – is said (to mean) "the understanding of the distinct positive entity (i.e., qualified by the exclusion of all that is non-cow)".
(3.17-18). And although it is said that (in the term cow) there is no occurrence of the word(s) "excluded from the other (non-cow)", nevertheless, since the term 'cow' indeed (already) harbours the 'negation of non-cow', there is no non-apprehension of the exclusion of the other (non-cow) which is (in fact) the form of an attribute (of the individual cow).[18]
(3.19-20). For example, awareness of blue colour in perceiving a blue-lotus, is at once inevitable from the term 'blue-lotus' which harbours the blue-lotus (the locus of the attribute);
(4.1-3). So also from the term cow which harbours negation of non-cow, discrimination of non-cow inevitably arises simultaneously with the perception of the cow, for (the negation of non-cow) is the qualifier (of the individual).
(4.4-6). Just as grasping a simple absence (prasajya)[19] of perception[20] is (nothing) but the force which generates a negative judgment, so also with affirmative judgments, the grasping of absence (in this case) is said to be precisely that force which, in accordance with the judgment (tadanurūpa), brings about merits of rites and (giving) charity (anuṣṭhānadāna).[21]
(4.7). But the apprehension of 'negation by implication'[22] is based on an intuitive knowledge[23] of the thing (and therefore) is commonly applied to both (affirmative and negative judgments).
(4.8-10). Otherwise, if the differentiation of the other entity (non-A) is not to be conceived at the same instant as the meaning of the term *A* is apprehended, the difficulty will arise: How can we act discriminately between *A* and *non-A*? Then, one could well tie horses etc., when asked to tie up a cow![24]
(4.11-13). (The Realist). Vācaspti[25] has said: "Individuals belong to universals and they are perceived (or apprehended) by judgmental constructions and words. And the form of these individuals possessed of their own class-character is excluded from the class-character of other things. Hence, since the class-character (tad) is known from (as) the understanding[26] (of the word), at the injuction 'Tie up the cow' one does not tie up horses, etc."

(4.14) tadapy anenaiva nirastam.
(4.15-17) yato jāter adhikāyāḥ prakṣepe'pi vyaktīnām rūpam atajjātīyavyāvṛttam eva cet, tadā tenaiva rūpeṇa śabdavikalpayor viṣayībhavantīnām katham atadvāvṛttiparihāraḥ?
(4.18-20) atha na vijātīyavyāvṛttam vyaktirūpam, tathāpratītam, vātadā jātiprasāda eṣa iti katham arthatopi tadavagatir ity uktaprāyam.
(5.1-3) atha jātivalādevānyato vyāvṛttam. bhavatu jātivalāt svahetuparamparāvalādvānyavyāvṛttam. ubhayathāpi vyāvṛttapratipattau vyāvṛttipratipattir astyeva.
(5.4-5) nacāgo'poḍhe gośabdasaṅketavidhāv anyonyāśrayadoṣah. sāmānye tadvati vā saṅkete'pi taddoṣāvakāśāt.
(5.6-7) na hi sāmānyam nāma sāmānyamātram abhipretam turagepi gośabdasaṅketaprasaṅgāt.
(5.7-9) kintu gotvam. tāvatā ca sa eva doṣaḥ. gavāparijñāne gotvasāmānyāparijñānāt. gotvasāmānyāparijñāne gośabdavācyāparijñānāt.

[27] tathāpratīta.
[28] prasāda = grace.
[29] When a thing is present and is pointed at we can cognize just an individual thing. But when a thing is not present and we apprehend it from the usage of a word or name, then, what is denoted by the word is, according to the realist, the universal entity which exists even when the individual thing is not present.
[30] Cf. above *AS*. (3.6-8).

(4.14). (The Buddhist). This view (of the Naiyāyika) is also refuted by the same (above given) argument.

(4.15-17). However, even if we admit the *discrepancy* of a universal as a separate entity, the form of individuals (as posited by the Realist) is indeed the one differentiated from the class-character of other things. Therefore, you cannot deny (the basic argument of the Buddhist) that an individual of the same form (as you the Realist have described), which is the object of word and judgment (śabda-vikalpa), is the negation of the other.

(4.18-20). Now, if it be argued (by the Realist): "If the form of an individual or a thing cognized as a particular[27] is not differentiated from the class-character of the other, then, this is, in fact, the (positive) presence[28] of its own class (that *A* is cognized as *A*)"; (otherwise without a class-character) "how can its (*A*) apprehension be possible from (mere) understanding?"[29] (The Buddhist). We have already answered these objections.[30]

(5.1-3). Suppose (the Realist) here insists that *A* is excluded from *non-A* only on the force (or due to) of its own class. (The Buddhist). Let it be due to the force of its own class. Or that (*A* is differentiated from *non-A*) on the force of succession of its own causes. In both cases, there is, in fact, (an acceptance of) a cognition of (an act of) differentiation, in the cognition of the differentiated thing.

(5.4-5) And, here, (the Realist's) objection – that thus an affirmative pointing use of the term 'cow' (when a cow is directly seen) and (the perception of) *the* cow excluded from non-cow would become interdependent – does not hold For, (in the Realistic view too) there is scope for this objection even when pointing at a class or an individual possessing a class-character (for the exclusion of other class-characters is also entailed there).

(5.6-7). Since by the term 'universal' (the Realist) does not intend merely (a general) universal; otherwise pointing at a horse also would be possible by the use of the term 'cow'. (Because a cow and a horse both belong to the same genus).

(5.7-9). But (The Realist too) intends a certain universal 'cow-ness', (as the meaning of the term cow). And thus (against this view) also the same objection stands. Because without cognition of an individual, there can be no cognition of the universal, 'cow-ness';

(5.10-12) tasmāt ekapiṇḍadarśanapūrvvako yaḥ sarvvavyaktisādhāraṇa iva bahir adhyasto vikalpabuddhyākāraḥ, tatrāyam gauriti saṅketakaraṇe netaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ.
(5.13) abhimate ca gośabdapravṛttāv agośabdena śeṣasyāpy abhidhānam ucitam.
(5.14-16) na cānyāpoḍhānyāpohayor vvirodho viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇakṣatirvvā; parasparavyavacchedābhāvāt, sāmānādhikaraṇyasadbhāvāt, bhūtalaghaṭābhāvavat.
(5.17) svābhāvena hi virodho na parābhāvenety ābālaprasiddham.
(5.18-19) eṣa panthāḥ Śrughnam upatiṣṭhata ity atrāpy apoho gamyata eva; aprakṛtapathāntarāpekṣayā eṣa eva. Śrughnapratyanīkāniṣṭa-
(6.1-2) sthānāpekṣayā Śrughnam eva. araṇyamārgavad vicchedābhāvād upatiṣṭhata eva. sārthadūtādivyavacchedena panthā eveti.
(6.3) pratipadam vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt.
(6.3-4) tasmād apohadharmmaṇo vidhirūpasya śabdād avagatiḥ;
(6.5) puṇḍarīkaśabdād iva śvetim aviśiṣṭasya padmasya.

[31] bahiradhyastaḥ.
[32] The contention seems to be that, notwithstanding the Realist view that 'cow' is discriminated from 'non-cow' on the basis of its own cow-ness, we are confronted with the problem of differentiating between two individual cows– i.e., the possessors of the same class-character. According to the Buddhist view the term 'non-cow' connotes not only lions, horses, etc. but also other individual cows – different from *this* cow. *PV.*, I.80-81; "vyāvṛttāḥ punaranyataḥ ta eva"; Karṇakagomin thereupon *PVST.*, p. 190: "arthā anyato vyāvṛttirūpiṇaḥ santa punaranyataḥ sajātīyād apī vyāvṛttā bhānti."
[33] "paraspara-vyavacchedābhāvāt", literally, 'since there is nothing to separate (the qualified and the qualifier) mutually'.
[34] According to the Buddhist, 'absence of a jar', in fact, refers to the perception of the bare ground (locus) of the jar. Cf. *NBT.*, p. 22.
[35] Therefore when a word denotes a positive entity it also simultaneously denotes all the attributes possessed by that entity.
[36] ābālaprasiddham: lit., 'known even to children'.
[37] Lit. (6.1). "Since there is not cut (in this) as in a forest foot-path, only this 'leads to'."

and without cognition of the universal, 'cow-ness' there can be no knowledge of the particualr cow which is denoted by the term 'cow'. (5.10-12). Hence the (so-called) class-character (or universal) is, in fact, a judgmental mental construction which is anteceded by the sense stimulus of one (individual) body (and thus) corresponds to an external entity (or the thing placed in the external form),[31] as if it were a common-character of all *the* (external) particulars; (thus) in pointing to (an external individual) cow: "this is a cow here" does not involve the discrepancy of mutual dependance (of a particular and its universal).

(5.13). And further, in our (Buddhist) view, (exclusion of) all other (members of the class cow) is also properly stated (or covered) by the term non-cow in the occurrence (pravṛtti) of the term cow.[32]

(5.14-16). And neither is there any contradiction (in the Buddhist view) that the positive and the negative (meanings are apprehended simultaneously), nor any confusion (or loss = kṣatiḥ) about the qualified and the qualifier (position of *A* and *non-A*); for these are not mutually separated,[33] because they reside in the same locus (substance) just as in the case of the (bare) ground and the absence of the jar.[34]

(5.17). The difference is due to *A*'s own nature but not due to the absence of *non-A*.[35] Everybody knows this fact.[36]

(5.18-19). (For example). "This path leads to (the town) Śrughna". Even here (in an affirmative proposition) discrimination is, indeed, cognized (from each and every word). (That is as follows):

(1). The term 'this' excluded all other paths from the one indicated (or This alone, no other path which is not stated here);

(2). No other undersired place but only to Śrughna; (6.1-2).

(3). 'Leads to' excludes all other forest foot-paths that end short (of Śrughna);[37]

(4). The term 'panthā' excludes (the use of) a driver etc. (for it is only a path (panthā) not a road).

(6.3). Thus, differentiation is naturally found in each and every term.

(6.3-4). Hence (the Buddhist view is correct that) the attributive differentiation is apprehended from a word in an affirmative form;

(6.5). Just as by the term puṇḍarīka or 'white-lotus', (we cognize) a lotus which is not separated from whiteness (attribute).

(6.5-6) yadyevam vidhireva śabdārtho vaktum ucitaḥ. katham apoho gīyata iti cet?
(6.7) uktam atrāpohaśabdenānyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhir ucyate;
(6.8) tatra vidhau pratīyamāne viśeṣaṇatayā tulyakālam anyāpoha-pratītir iti.
(6.9-10) na caivam pratyakṣasyāpyapohaviṣayatvavyavasthā kart-tum ucitā; tasya śābdapratyayasyeva vastuviṣayatve vivādābhāvāt.
(6.11-12) vidhiśabdena ca yathādhyavasāyam atadrūpaparāvṛtto vāhyortho, bhimataḥ; yathāpratibhāsam buddhyākāraśca.
(6.13) tatra vāhyorthodhyavasāyādeva śabdavācyo vyavasthāpyate.
(6.14-15) na svalakṣaṇaparisphūrttyā pratyakṣavad deśakālāva-sthāniyatapravyakta-svalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt.
(6.15-17) yacchaśāstram:

śabdenāvyāpṛtākhyasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt.
arthasya dṛṣṭāv iveti,

(6.18-19) indriyaśabdasvabhāvopāyabhedāt ekasyaiva pratibhā-sabheda iti cet? atrāpy uktam:

[38] Lit. (6.5-6). "If that is so, then, it is proper to say that the meaning of a term is only a positive (affirmative) thing."
[39] Cp., above *AS.*, (3.7-9). Also *JN.*, p. 202.
[40] Cp. above *AS.*, (2.19), and (3.2).
[41] śabda-pratyaya = abhidā or 'simple meaning of a word.' But '*the* cow', or 'this is a cow' is not a *simple* meaning but judgmental or *determinative* meaning and therefore entails 'differentiation'.
[42] 'bāhy-ārtha': The term artha in Sanskrit has as many shed as the English 'meaning' but here with 'bāhya' it is clearly intended to denote 'external object'.
[43] Stop after 'buddhyākāraśca'. Cf. *RN.*, p. 55.
[44] Cp. *JN.*, p. 208: "artho dvividhaḥ bāhya antaraśca, ... bāhyaḥ adhyavasā-yādeva vācyo vyavasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇa-parisphurttyā."
[45] The Buddhists do not admit that the extreme particular real can be "uttered". The thing-in-itself is unutterable. Cf. Stcherbatsky's rendering of *NVTT.*, on Apohavāda, *BL.*, II. p. 425 (342.6) n. 4 and p. 264 (88.26).
[46] pravyakta.
[47] niyata.
[48] Cp. *BL.*, II. p. 264 (88.25): "Thus it is that what is really perceived (by the senses) is not the meaning (sambandha) of a name, and what is meant by a name is not what is really perceived (by the senses)." See also Keith's *Atomism.*, p. 101 n. 2, and *NBT.*, p. 16 referred to therein.

(6.5-6). (The Realists' objection). "Well, then, isn't it proper to define the meaning of a term as affirmative (positive) alone?[38] Why do you (Buddhist) keep harping on (gīyate) 'Differentiation'?"
(6.7). (The Buddhist rejoins). To this we have said[39] that it is the positive thing (affirmative meaning) qualified by the exclusion of other things (*non-A*), that is meant by the term 'Differentiation'; (6.8). This means 'exclusion of *non-A*, as a qualifier, is apprehended simultaneously with apprehension of the positive thing *A*'.
(6.9-10). And thus the (Realist's) view that even sense-perception is differentiative,[40] is not correct; for there is no difference of opinion about (the fact) that the object of sense-perception is an objective thing, just as the direct meaning of a word is (an objective thing).[41]
(6.11-12). And by the term 'affirmation' (or affirmative meaning), we (Buddhists) intend (two things): (a). an external object[42] – according to the logical synthesis (negatively) excluded from all other forms (of things); and (b). an ideal image – corresponding to the sense-stimulus (of the thing).
(6.13).[43] Here, an external (particular) object is established (by the Buddhists) as verbally expressable only as being a sense-datum.[44]
(6.14-15). (But), it is not the case that the thing-in-itself is reflected (in the word).[45] The 'thing-in-itself' (reality) does not appear (in the word) as (it does) in the sense-perception, where it becomes manifest[46] with the fixed[47] time and space (momentary) relation.[48]
(6.15-17). (The following reference to) an authoritative work[49] also (substantiates the Buddhist view): "The (real) thing is called 'unexpresible by the word'[50] because by its name it is not reflected in the mind (in the same way) as (it is) in the sense-stimulus".[51]
(6.18-19). Now, (the Realist may argue): "The difference in reflexions of the same (one) thing is due to the difference in means[52]

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[49] According to Prof. Anantalal Thakur (*RN.*, p. 151) this passage refers to a work '*Sākārasamgrahasūtra*' of Jñānaśrī, the Buddhist teacher of Ratnakīrti. The work is now published along with other essays of Jñānaśrī. See *JN.*
[50] śabdenāvyāpṛta. Lit., 'not covered by the word'.
[51] Cf. below *AS.* (11-17), "na svalakṣaṇasya śabdavikalpa-liṅgapratibhāsitvam".
[52] upāybhedāt.

(7.1-2) jāto nāmāśrayonyānyaḥ cetasāntasya vastunaḥ.
ekasyaiva kuto rūpam bhinnākārāvabhāsi tat.[b]

(7.3-5) na hi spaṣṭāspaṣṭa dve rūpe parasparaviruddhe ekasya vastunaḥ staḥ; yata ekenendriyabuddhau pratibhāsetānyena vikalpe, tathā sati vastuna eva bhedaprāpteḥ; na hi svarūpabhedād aparo vastubhedaḥ.

(7.6-7) na ca pratibhāsabhedād aparasvarūpabhedaḥ; anyathā trailokyam ekameva vastu syāt.

(7.8-9) dūrāsannadeśavarttinoḥ puruṣayoḥ ekatra śākhini spaṣṭāspaṣṭapratibhāsabhedepi na śākhibheda iti cet?

(7.10-11) na brūmaḥ pratibhāsabhedobhinnavastu niyataḥ. kintu, ekaviṣayatvābhāvaniyata iti. tato yatrārthakriyābhedādisacivaḥ pratibhāsabhedaḥ tatra vastubhedaḥ, ghaṭavat.

[b] Cp. Dharmakīrti: *PV.*, III. 236.

[53] svabhāva.

[54] Since, accordint to the Buddhists, only *svalakṣaṇa* is perceived, ākāra = vikalpa = anyāpoha or universal or difference is the *referent* of the term (word). The Realists argue; why not admit different reflexions viz., particular and universal, as two real parts of one objective reality with their difference based on the difference of medium of cognition?

[55] This verse occurs in Dharmakīrti's *PV.*, III.236.

[56] The reality of the extreme particular point-instant cannot be divided on the ground that it is apprehended with different substances and through different means. Cp. Prajñākaragupta, *PVP.*, p. 302 (on Dharmakīrti's *PV.* III.236), and p. 621 "anyāpohaḥ śabdārthaḥ" section.

[57] Here, Ratnakīrti is verbally quoting his 'guru' cp. *JN.*, p. 208-209.

[58] vikalpa.

[59] bhedaprāpteḥ.

[60] This means: Not-(non-A) = A, because $A \equiv A$. The argument is in support of the Buddhist view that the particular positive qualified entity is alone the real "thing-in-itself" (svalakṣaṇa).

[61] Thus, since attributes, universals, actions, and inherence (relation) do not produce any reflex distinct or separate from the substance, they possess no distinct efficiency by themselves and therefore cannot be regarded as separate or distinct entities. Cf. Stcherbatsky's *BL.*, II. p. 266 (89.8-11).

[62] In fact, the *NV.* authors do admit a higher type of universality "which consists of existence alone", cf. Keith's *Atomism.*, p. 193; *PBh.* (1895), p. 11.

[63] Lit. (7.9). 'na śākhibheda iti cet'? ... there is no difference.

[64] Reflexion is of two types: (1) of the real and (2) of the unreal (universal). Where it is produced by something which is an efficient point instant entity, i.e., reality for the Buddhist, in such cases the judgment 'this is *A*' contains the negation of all that which is *non-A*. But the other type of reflexion is produced by mental constructions in which we fail to grasp the difference between two point instant particulars and consequently ascribing to them a common-characteristic. This reflexion of an unreal attribute is the 'universal reality'

- (i.e. either) the senses or the word (as cognizing) reality"[53]/[54] (The Buddhist). To this also (Dharmakīrti)[55] says:
(7.1-2). "of a thing as a whole" the other is, indeed engendered by the mind on the basis of different loci, for instance, the blue colour in different substances. (Q). How can (different) forms belong to the same (one) thing? (Ans.). That (difference) reflects (not the point instant but) different images (a) (mentally constructed)".[56]
(7.3-5). There are no two mutually contradictory forms, viz., determinate (particular) and non-determinate (universal) belonging to one and the same entity;[57] so that by one form (the former), it would be reflected in the cognition of the sense-perception (= sensation) and by the other in the reproductive imagination (= reason.[58] If it were so, then, indeed, the object (it-self) would have to be divided,[59] while, in fact, the distinct-ness of a thing is nothing else but its distinct self-character.[60]
(7.6-7). And the distinct self-character is nothing other than the distinct reflexion (produced by the thing in our mind).[61] Otherwise, (if the Realist does not accept this view that reality is only the particular thing that has efficiency to produce a distinct reflexion), the whole of the Universe would be (apprehended as) only one thing (i e., the non-determinate Existent Universal and everyday behavior would be impossible).[62]
(7.8-9). If (the Realist) argues: "When two persons are one nearer and the other farther from a tree, although both perceive the same tree, (on account of difference of proximity) they have determinate and non-determinate reflexions (= sensations) and yet there is only one tree (differently reflected)?[63]
(7.10-11). No, we (the Buddhists) do not assert that the distinct (different) stimulus (pratibhāsa-bheda) is determined by the non-differentiated object (abhinnavastu); on the contrary (we maintain) that the common (= universal) perception is determined by the fact of its not being concerned with the extreme particular (atomic event). Hence (the experience) of a distinct entity, such as a jar, is there where there is the distinct momentary indefinite sensation (pratibhāsa-bheda) assisted by the distinct causal efficiency etc.[64]

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for the Realist, but for the Buddhist it is the absence of grasping the difference of particulars. Cp. Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, II. pp. 403-4, p. 412 n. 6.

(7.12-13) anyatra punarnniyamenaikaviṣayatām pariharatītyeka-pratibhāso bhrāntaḥ.
(7.14-15) etena yad āha Vācaspatiḥ: na ca śabdapratyakṣayorvva-stugocaratve pratyayābhedaḥ kāraṇabhedena pārokṣyabhedopa-patter iti.
(7.16-18) tan nopayogi. parokṣapratyayasya vastugocaratvāsa-marthanāt. parokṣatāśrayastu kāraṇabheda indriyagocaragrahaṇa-viraheṇaiva kṛtārthaḥ.
(7.18-20) tanna śābde pratyaye svalakṣaṇam parisphurati, kiñca svalakṣaṇātmani vastuni vācye sarvvātmanā pratipatteḥ, vidhini-ṣedhayorayogaḥ.
(8.1-3) tasya hi sadbhāvestīti vyartham, nāstīty asamartham; asadbhāve nāstīti vyartham astīty asamartham. asti cāstyādipa-daprayogaḥ.[c]
(8.3-4) tasmāt śabdapratibhāsasya vāhyārthabhāvābhāvasādhā-raṇyam na tadviṣayatām kṣamate.
(8.5-6) yacca Vācaspatinā jātimad vyaktivācyatām svavācaiva prastutyānanantaram eva na ca śabdārthasya jāterbhāvābhāvasā-dhāraṇyam nopapadyate;

[c] Read: asti *nā*stīyādi ...
[65] Cp. above (7.10-11).
[66] Stcherbatsky's rendering of *NVTT.*, *BL.*, II. p. 413 n. 1: (339. 28-340.5).
[67] Cp. the Realist's view, *BL.*, II. p. 286 (93.20).
[68] 'nopayogi', lit., 'not useful, workable'.
[69] kṛtārthaḥ.
[70] Cp. *BL.*, II. pp. 258-261 (88.1-10).
[71] parisphurati.
[72] śābdapratyaye.
[73] Cp. *BL.*, II. p. 264 (88.25) "Thus it is that what is really perceived (by the senses) is not the meaning of a name, and what is meant by a name is not what is really perceived (by the senses)."
[74] The Buddhist contention is that if the genus Existence (satta) were inherent in "cow" – as the Realist believes – "the judgment 'the cow is not' or 'there is not cow' would be a contradiction." Cp. *BL.*, II. p. 415 n. 3 and p. 416 n. 4: "Since in the absolute there is no possibility of affirmation-negation (nopalab-hyate sādhāraṇa-grahaṇam), every thing we can alternatively affirm and deny is

(7.12-13). In the other case (the person having) only one reflexion is under an illusion, again by the (same)[65] rule "absence (of graspe ing) one objectiveness (of two things is illusory)" (i.e. neglecting the difference).[66]

(7.14-15). Now, (we come to) another argument of Vācaspati according to which (the Realist) asserts: "since the difference between the impercipient and the percipient is based on the difference between their respective causes, no (difficulty) of non-differentiation of apprehension of an object perceived through words and the senses will arise"?[67]

(7.16-18). (The Buddhist). This view is not satisfactory.[68] For the view that an indirect cognition is produced from the direct objectiv-stimulus, cannot be supported. Because the ground of indirect perceptibility (of differentiation = apoha) is (its) separate cause (apoha being a logical synthesis), which is meaningful[69] only because (its) apprehension is not possible by sense-perception.[70]

(7.18-20). Hence, it is not "the thing-in-itself" (svalakṣaṇa) which is apprehended[71] in the verbal cognition.[72] Because if "the thing-in-itself" is to be the direct meaning (denotation) of the word, it must be known (at once) in its entirety (sarvātmnā); (then) there would be no function of affirmative and negative propositions.[73]

(8.1-3). If *A* is existent, it is superfluous to say "A exists", (and) the negative judgment "*A* does not exist" is not valid. On the other hand, if *A* is not existent, the judgment "*A* does not exist" is superfluous and "*A* exists" is not valid. But there are such propositional usages (concerning the same entity), as "*A* exists" (and does not exist) etc.

(8.3-4). Therefore, (reality) cannot be the object of reference of the term (word) which commonly expresses both the existence and non-existence (i.e. relativity) of an external thing.[74]

(8.5-6). Furthermore, Vācaspati (the Realist), having himself explained the meaning of the term 'individual' as that which posseses a universal, said:

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excluded from the domain of real, i.e., absolute existence." See also Siddheshwar Varma, Shastri, "Analysis of Meaning in the Indian Philosophy of Language", *JRAS*. (1925), p. 30.

(8.6-12) sā hi svarūpato nityāpi deśakālaviprakīrṇānekavyaktyāśrayatayā bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇībhavann astināsti-sambandhayogyā; varttamānavyaktisambandhitā hi jāter astitā; atītānāgatavyaktisambandhitā ca nāstiteti sandigdhavyatirekitvād anaikāntikam bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇyam anyathāsiddham veti vilapitam.
(8.13-14) tāvanna prakṛtakṣatiḥ. jātau *bharam*[d] nyasyatā svalakṣaṇāvācyatvasya svayam svīkārāt.
(8.15-1616) kiñca sarvvatra padārthasya svalakṣaṇa svarūpeṇaivāstitvādikam cintyate. jātestu varttamānādivyaktisambandhostitvādikam iti tu bālapratāraṇam.
(8.17-18) evam jātimad vyaktivacane'pi doṣaḥ; vyakteś cet pratītisiddhiḥ, jātir adhikā pratīyatām, mā

[d] Read: jātau *bhāram*; cf. *RN.*, p. 56.
[75] The whole of the following passage of Vācaspati's *NVTT.*, has been completely translated by Stcherbatsky in *BL.*, II. pp. 421-422. (341.9-12). It should be remembered that Vācaspatimiśra (c. 976 A.D.) had mainly criticized Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara and Ratnakīrti following his teacher Jñānaśrī (c. 1050 A.D.) was the last Buddhist author in the History of Indian Philosophy to refute the charges of the Brahmanic schools against Buddhism. Cf. Thakur, Int., to *RN.*
[76] (*BL.*, II. p. 421 n. 5). "e.g., 'a cow is', 'a cow is not'; we cannot say 'something is', 'something is not', because something is a thing and 'is' by itself ...". According to the Naiyāyika, the genus Existence (sattā) is inherent in a cow, it must then be inseparable from it. According to the Buddhist, Existence or "Something" existent is the transcendental substratum of a cow's reality.
[77] Cf. above *AS.* (8.3-4).
[78] anaikāntikam samdigdha-vyatirekitvāt – Lit., "not absolute because of a doubtful contraposition." *BL.*, II. p. 422 n. 1.
[79] anyathāsiddham.
[80] Cp. S. Varma, *JRAS.*, 1929, p. 24 (1). Vācaspatimiśra maintained that a word denotes the universal including individuals.
[81] vilapitam.
[82] kṣatiḥ: Lit., damage.
[83] prakṛta.
[84] jātau bharam nyasyatā. Read 'bhāram' instead of 'bharam', cf., *RN.*, p. 56. Lit., 'placing the weight on the universal.'
[85] svalakṣaṇa.
[86] sarvatra or lit., everywhere.
[87] sva-rūpa or lit., the self-nature.
[88] svalakṣaṇa Cf. *BL.*, II. p. 416 n. 4.
[89] padārtha or category.
[90] cintyate.
[91] Cf. above *AS.* (8.6-12). "Etc." means non-existence. That is Vācaspati said

(8.6-12).[75] "Nor is it right that if the Universal were (a reality) expressed by its name, it could not be commonly applicable to positive and negative expressions (as admitting equally a connection with existence and non-existence".[76] A Universal, indeed, is by itself an eternal (unchanging) entity, but as residing in an infinite number of particulars scattered about in space and time it can be alternately affirmed and denied. We can sometimes say "it is", and sometimes "it is not". Its existence is nothing but its actual presence in a particular thing, its non-existence is (its absence, i.e.), its residence in a past or in a future space-time. Thus the proposition "whatsoever can be alternately affirmed and denied (is unreal)",[77] cannot be admitted as proved,[78] since its contraposition, (viz., the proposition "whatsoever is real cannot be alternately affirmed and denied:) is not proved. It is wrongly established[79] (since we have given an explanation of the fact of an alternate affirmation and negation)".[80]

(8.13-14). (The Buddhist). This has been wrongly uttered[81] (by Vācaspati). But from this too there is no potential opposition[82] to the view[83] presented (or upheld by the Buddhists). Since, by stressing the universal[84] (as the meaning of the word) you yourself have admitted that 'the thing-in-itself'[85] (point-instant) is not denoted by the word.

(8.15-16). Moreover, in all cases[86] it is the identity[87] of 'the thing-in-itself'[88] of Reality[89] which is conceived[90] as existence etc. While (Vācaspati's statement) about the Universal: "Its existence etc. is nothing but its actual presence etc., in a particular thing"[91] – is merely the fooling of a child.[92]

(8.17-18). Thus, to say that it is the individual that possesses the universal, is also not correct;[93] if the individual is established by its perception, (and the Realist believes that the universal is also a distinct entity, then), the universal must (also) be perceived in addition[94] (to its individual);

"non-existence of a universal is its residence in a past or in a future space-time".

92 bāla-pratāraṇam.

93 doṣaḥ or lit., error or discrepancy.

94 adhika.

(9.1) vā, na tu vyaktipratītidoṣān muktiḥ.
(9.2-4) etena yad ucyate Kaumārilaiḥ: sabhāgatvād eva vastuno na sādhāraṇyadoṣaḥ. vṛkṣatvam hy anirddhāritabhāvābhāvam śabdād avagamyate. tayor anyatareṇa śabdāntarāvagatena sambadhyata iti.
(9.5-6) tad apy asaṅgatam; sāmānyasya nityasya pratipattāvanirddhāritabhāvābhāvatvāyogāt.
(9.6-8) yaccedam naca pratyakṣasyeva śabdānāṁ arthapratyāyanaprakāro yena tad adṛṣṭa evāstyādiśabdāpekṣā na syāt; vicitraśaktitvāt pramāṇānām iti.
(9.9-11) tadapy aindriyakśābdapratibhāsayorekasvarūpagrāhitve bhinnāvabhāsadūṣaṇena dūṣitam. vicitra śaktitvañca pramāṇānām sākṣātkārādhyavasāyābhyām api caritārtham.

[95] For Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's view see *Śl. Vārt.*, sections on Apohavāda and Abhāva.
[96] Sabhāgatva. The postulation of the division of reality into "existence" (*bhāva*) and "non-existence" (abhāva), by the Realist schools seems to be done mainly to oppose the Buddhist theory of Apoha, while defending the universal as reality (padārtha). The very fact that the Bhaṭṭas and the later *NV.* after Udayana posit this twofold division of reality indicates the Buddhist pressure on them. (Cf. *Kir.*, p. 1). Amongst the Mīmāṃsakas, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was the foremost opponent of the Buddhists and (*NV*) Udayana undertook the task of defending the Brahmanical logical system. In his 'Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi' and 'Ātma-tattva-viveka' his main task has been to refute Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrī. (Cf. *RN.*, Int., pp. 21-22, and Int., *JN.*, by Thakur).
[97] Cf., S. Varma, *JRAS.*, 1929, p. 24 (1); *Śl. Vārt.*, p. 476 Abhāva Chapter, verse 12, and p. 599, Apòha ch., verses 110, 125.
[98] vṛkṣatvam.
[99] avagamyate.
[100] Cp. *BL.*, II. p. 265 n. 11.
[101] asaṅgatam.
[102] pratipatti or apprehension.
[103] nitya or eternal.
[104] ayoga or that which cannot be yoked together.
[105] artha-pratyāyana-prakāraḥ.
[106] pramāṇa.
[107] The contention is that perception refers to the thing itself while the word (śābdapramāṇa) corresponds to the universal and this is the unique force of this *means of knowledge*.
[108] avabhāsa.
[109] aindriyakaśābda-pratibhāsayoḥ.
[110] ekasvarūpa. That is only one unitary entity: not consisting of two different entities: (a) particularity and (b) universality, as the Realists believe.
[111] caritārtham.
[112] sākṣātkārādhyavasāyābhyāṁ. The term adhyavasāya means 'judgmental perception' as opposed to 'direct sense-perception', and thus it is the former that is expressed by a word.

(9.1). Or, for the sake of argument let us admit that the universal is not perceived although it is a distinct entity (= mā vā); even then (the Realist) cannot be free from error, for (only) the particular is perceived, (and not the universal, which remains as a logical category).
(9.2-4). Now, (the Buddhist proposes to refute) the view of the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa:[95] "Since reality consists of (two) aspects (or parts)[96] there is no discrepancy in the view that (a universal = reality) is common (to both existence and non-existence).[97] Tree-ness[98] is apprehended[99] from the word (tree) without determining (its) existence or non-existence. (And) it is related to either of the two (i.e., existence or non-existence) (only) after understanding another word (the predicate 'is' or 'is not')".[100]
(9.5-6). (The Buddhist rejoins). This view is also inconsistent;[101] since the cognition[102] of a constant and imperishable[103] universal, (i.e. a positive existent thing), cannot coincide[104] with an object the existence and non-existence of which is not (yet) determined.
(9.6-8). (The Mīmāṃsaka's argument). It may be said that "The way of understanding the meaning of words[105] is not the same as that of sense-perception. For as the perception of a thing does not depend on (the use of) predicates such as 'is' etc., (the meaning of a word can also be established without "is" etc.). For the means of valid knowledge[106] (i.e. word) possess a unique force (of bringing about the cognition of the universal entity which is not capable of being perceived by simple sense-perception)".[107]
(9.9-11). (The Buddhist). This view is also rejected by the refutation (of the realistic view) that there is a separate entity to be judged (or reflected)[108] (apart from the extreme particular real), since what is grasped by the sensual and the verbal reflexions[109] (in the mind) is (ultimately) one-and-the-same identical individual reality.[110] As (to the second argument) viz. that of "the unique force of the *means* of knowledge", (we Buddhists also honour the force of the pramāṇas but we say) that it can also be meaningful[111] (even if you accept the view that only the unitary individual is ultimately apprehended) by direct sense-perception and by the logical synthesis (expressible by the word).[112]

(9.12-13) tato yadi pratyakṣārthapratipādanam śābdena tadvadevāvabhāsaḥ syāt; abhavaṃśca na tad viṣayakhyāpanam kṣamate.
(9.14-15) nanu vṛkṣaśabdena vṛkṣatvāṃśe codite sattvādy aṃśaniścayanārtham asty ādipadaprayoga iti cet?
(9.16-17) niraṃśatvena pratyakṣa-samadhigatasya svalakṣaṇasya ko'vakāśaḥ padāntareṇa; dharmmāntaravidhiniṣedhayoḥ pramāṇāntareṇa vā.
(9.18) pratyakṣe'pi pramāṇāntarāpekṣā dṛṣṭeti cet?
(9.19-20) bhavatu tasyāniścayātmatvāt anabhyasta-svarūpaviṣaye; vikalpastu svayaṃ niścayātmako yatra grāhī tatra kim apareṇa?
(10.1) asti ca śabdaliṅgāntarāpakṣā tato na vastu svarūpagraḥ.

[113] pratipādanam.
[114] avabhāsa. The contention is that if the efficient reality were utterable, our experience at the utterance of the word or the name would be the same as that of the sense contact. The mouth should burn and cold disappear by the pronouncement of 'f-i-r-e'. Cf. *BL.*, II. p. 264 (88.26) and also f.n. 11.
[115] abhavan.
[116] khyāpanam.
[117] The Buddhist contention is that the reality is in-it-self single, – a unitary particular. It is not a dual entity, particular and universal. Thus in direct sense-perception only this unitary thing is perceived which alone is the efficient real entity. But the object of a judgmental perception (adhyavasāya = vikalpa) is not the *momentary*, particular thing-in-itself but its general image, a mentally constructed non efficient logical synthesis and this alone is the subject of affirmation or negation. Therefore the word denotes only the relation between the *momentary* thing and its image and this (relation) is not a universal reality but merely a logical synthesis. Cf. *RN.*, pp. 67-78; *BL.*, II. pp. 424-425.
[118] codite.
[119] niraṃśa. Cf. above note 110.
[120] Lit., 'ko'vakāśah' – what scope is there? *PVS.*, p. 139, "nirbhāgasya vastuno grahaṇe ko'nyastadā na grahītaḥ." *BL.*, II. p. 269 (90.2).
[121] According to the Buddhist view when a thing *A* is affirmed or denied, its whole unitary self is affirmed or denied in its entirety. If it be affirmed, all its attributes are affirmed thereby. And if it be denied, all its attributes are denied. Cf. *PVP.*, p. 616, "na ca kiñcid avasitam kiñcinneti śakya samarthanam. vibhāgasyāsattvāt". See also *PV.*, IV. 230-231; *PVS.*, p. 122, "anavakāśaḥ pramāṇāntarasya vṛttiḥ."
[122] As, for example, a child for the first time seeing a red rose, without the authority of the corresponding Word (śabdapramāṇa), i.e., of an elder person or a descriptive work, cannot have the judgment "this is a red rose". Thus the Realists maintain that to perceive a real universal attribute, such as colour, name, etc. of a thing we depend on a *pramāṇa* other than the simple sense perception viz. the śabda or World determining the cognition of universal reality.
[123] bhavatu.

(9.12-13). Thus, if the object of (direct) sense-perception (could also be) apprehended (or grasped)[113] by the verbal (reflexion), the experience[114] would also be the same (as in the sense-perception). And since (that) does not happen[115] (a term) cannot convey[116] an object which belongs to that (direct sense-perception).[117]

(9.14-15). (The Mīmāṃsaka). "Since by the term 'tree' (only) the tree-ness, (the universal) part of (reality), is evoked in the mind,[118] the use of the predicate 'is' etc., (is necessary) for determining (the other) part (of reality), existence (qua particular entity) etc".? If this be the argument (of the Mīmāṃsaka) (the Buddhist answer is as follows).

(9.16-17). Since, the 'thing-in-itself' (reality) is unitary[119] and grasped in sense-perception in its entirety, there is no (other separate part of reality), left out of perception, to be grasped by another term (or predicate 'is' and 'is not');[120] nor by another *means* of knowledge is it possible to establish another attribute which is (not already invoked by) the affirmation or negation (of the thing).[121]

(9.18). (The Mīmāṃsakas' objection). "Even after a simple sense-perception dependence on other *means* of knowledge (for the judgment) is found (necessary)"[122]

(9.19-20). (The Buddhist answers). That may be true[123] only with regard to a thing whose form and characteristics are not familiar. In that case the sense perception is not successful in determining (the fact); but in the case of a mental construction (i.e., a term or logical synthesis) which is itself determinative, there is no need for another *means* (of judgment) for its apprehension.[124]

(10.1). But to grasp the (distinct) reality of an object (we) do depend on other (different) terms and logical marks.[125]

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[124] The Buddhist regards vikalpa = adhyavasāya as a logical synthesis. Although ultimately based on perception it is free from the sense-object contact. *RN.*, p. 83: "pratyakṣam anumānam pratyakṣapṛṣthabhāvi ca vikalpaḥ" and p. 124: "agrhīto'pi pravṛttiviṣayo' dhyavaseyaḥ".

[125] The question is that since the Buddhist admits only one unitary reality and that is the object of sense-perception, why does he, then, need to posit any other means of judgment viz., Inference or word and reason = śabdaliṅga = apoha; and how can any other means be valid without corresponding to any reality? See *BL.*, II. p. 270 (90.3); *PV.*, I. 49.

(10.2-4) nanu bhinnā jāty ādayo dharmmāḥ parasparaṃ dharmmiṇaśceti jātilakṣaṇaikadharmmadvāreṇa pratītepi śākhini dharmmāntaravattayā na pratītir iti.
(10.5) kinna bhinnābhidhān ādhīno dharmmāntarasya nīlacaloccaistaratvāder avabodhaḥ.
(10.6-7) tad etad asaṅgatam; akhaṇḍātmanaḥ svalakṣaṇasya pratyakṣe pratibhāsāt. dṛśyasya dharmmadharammibhedasya pratyakṣapratikṣiptatvād,
(10.8-9) anyathā sarvvam sarvvatra syād ity atiprasaṅgaḥ. kālpanikabhedāśrayastu dharmmadharmmivyavahāra iti prasādhitam śāstre;
(10.10) bhavatu vā pāramārthiko dharmmadharmmibhedaḥ.
(10.11-12) tathāpy anayoḥ samavāyāder dūṣitatvād upakāralakṣaṇaiva pratyāsattir eṣitavyā.
(10.12-16) evañca yathendriyapratyāsattyā pratyakṣeṇa dharmmipratipattau sakalataddharmmapratipattiḥ. tathā śabdaliṅgābhyām

[126] dharma or attribute.
[127] dharmin (substance) locus.
[128] śākhin.
[129] avabodhaḥ.
[130] Cp. *BL.*, II. p. 275 (91.1).
[131] akhaṇḍa = niraṃśa. Cp. above *AS.* (9.16). According to K. K. Raja the Buddhist theory of Apoha may be included in "the Akhaṇḍapakṣa or the *Gestalt* view, of which Bhartṛhari, who wrote *Vākyapadīya* in the fourth century A.D., is the greatest exponent, (according to which) the fundamental linguistic fact is the sentence considered as an integral language symbol. Words are more abstractions made from sentence by linguistic analysis and have only a pragmatic value." "Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians", *op. cit.*, p. 1.
[132] Cp. *PVS.*, pp. 241-242 and Karṇakagomin therein; "nahi vṛkśādiṣu dvau pratibhāsāvupalabhyete. ekaḥ śākhādyākāro' paraścāśākhādyākāraḥ." We do not have two cognitions of the same tree at one-given time-place relation, viz., one consisting of the branches and the other of not-branches.
[133] atiprasaṅgaḥ.
[134] If "Differentiation" were not cognitive but perceptual we would have perceived at once all that is *non-A* in the determination of *A*. Cp. *BL.*, II. 267 ff.
[135] We are not sure whether Ratnakīrti here refers to Dharmkīrti or Jñānaśrī. However the same expressions can be found in the passages ascribed to Dharmakīrti by Stcherbatsky, cf. *BL.*, II. p. 273 n. 2.
[136] Cp. *BL.*, II. 275 (90.28), "(The Buddhist's view is that) the attributes are not something apart from the substance of the thing, but productive imagination constructs them as something different. Thus (the synthetic images) are not due to a stimulus coming from the object (but due to imagination)."

(10.2-4). (The Realist). "Since, such properties as the universal (particular) etc. are different attributes[126] (of the same object) and mutually harbour[127] each other, although from the term 'tree' (i.e. the possessor of branches)[128] we know the tree as the possessor of only one attribute, viz., its one universal character, the tree is not apprehended as being the possessor of another (its particular) characteristic. (Therefore), (10.5) is it not (a fact that) there is a cognition[129] of another characteristic, viz., the quality of possessing very high branches floating in the blue sky, etc., (and) this (other characteristic) is expressed by another name?[130]
(10.6-7). (The Buddhist). This view is absurd; for (we Buddhists have already stated that) it is the undivided (unitary)[131] reality of the 'thing-in-itself' that is reflected in the sense-perception.[132] (And also) because (the judgment of) the difference between the characteristics and the characterized *perceptual thing* does not arise out of the sense-perception. (Differentiation is logical and thus a cognitive act.)
(10.8-9). Otherwise there would be the universal-absurdity[133] of everything being present everywhere.[134] This has been well explained in the śāstra[135] (in this way): behaviour of (distinguishing between) characteristics and the characterized (or Quality and Substance), is, indeed, (not based on their real difference) but grounded in the mentally constructed difference.[136]
(10.10). Or let us suppose that the difference between the characteristic and the characterized is real.[137]
(10.11-12). Nevertheless, since both are corrupted (falsely assumed to be interdependent)[138] by Inherence, etc. and relational knowledge of them[139] must be posited only as qualifying[140] (each other).[141]
(10.12-16). And thus, just as in perception, through the relational knowledge (or the judgmental relation) arising from the sense-

[137] paramārthikaḥ.
[138] dūṣitatvād.
[139] pratyāsatti. Cp. below *AS*. (10.16).
[140] upakāralakṣaṇā.
[141] Cp. *BL*., II. pp. 266-267 (n. 3 on p. 267).

api vācyavācakādi sambandhapratibaddhābhyām dharmmipratipattau niravaśeṣataddharmmapratipattir bhavet; pratyāsattimātrasy āviśeṣāt.

(10.17-19) yacca Vācaspatiḥ: na caikopādhinā sattve (sattvena?) viśiṣṭe tasmin gṛhīte upādhyantar aviśiṣṭa-tadgrahaḥ. svabhāvo hi dravyasya upādhibhir vviśiṣyate. natūpādhayo

(11.1) vā viśeṣyatvam vā tasya svabhāva iti. tadapi plavata eva.

(11.2-3) nahy abhedād upādhyantara-grahaṇañca māsañjitam.[e] bhedam puraskṛtyaivopakārakagrahaṇe upakāryyagrahaṇaprasañjanāt.

(11.4-5) na cāgnidhūmayoḥ kāryyakāraṇabhāva iva svabhāvata eva dharmmadharmmiṇoḥ pratiniyamakalpanam ucitam.

[e] Read: 'āsañjitam'. 'māsañjtam' is apparently an error. Cp. below line 12, and *RN.*, p. 57.

[142] Or: at the apprehension of the substance all its attributes are apprehended through the judgmental relation (pratyāsatti) simultaneously in the sense-perception ....

[143] śabdaliṅga = apoha.

[144] pratibaddha. Cf. *BL.*, II. p. 416 n. 2.

[145] vācya-vācaka = kārya-kāraṇa = jñāpya-jñāpakabhāvaḥ. Although these terms differ in their connotative usage they express the 'cause and effect' relation. Cp. *PKM.* (2nd ed.), p. 441; *NVTT.* (Banares ed.), p. 135.

[146] The contention of the passage seems to be that the realtion between *A* and *non-A* or the characterized and the characteristic or the particular and the so called universal cannot be that of the cause and effect and therefore we do not cognize two separate entities. Cf. *BL.*, II. p. 267. However the relation between the word and the differentiated conceptual image is that of the cause and effect and therefore the term denotes differentiation or apoha. Cp. *BL.*, II. p. 287 n. 3.

[147] sattva or reality or thing.

[148] upādhi or an imposed property.

[149] svabhāvo hi dravyasya. Lit., the self-nature of the substance.

[150] viśeṣyatvam = viśiṣṭatvam = sambandha = samavāya. Cf. *BL.*, II. p. 288 n. 5.

[151] Stcherbatsky's translation of the *NVTT.*, of Vācaspati, apparently of the same passage which has been referred to here by Ratnakīrti, is as follows: "And not, if this one is characterized by one characteristic, the consequence of its being perceived as characterized by other characteristics. Indeed, the substance of the thing is characterized by the characteristics, but neither the characteristics nor the fact of being characterized by them are the substance." *BL.*, II. p. 288. n. 7 (3.26-28).

[152] plavata eva. Or weightless or does not hold ground.

contact, when a characterized thing is apprehended,[142] all its characteristics (referred to by *non-A*) are apprehended, when the characterized (*A*) is apprehended by the term and the logical mark[143] that are invariably concommitant[144] with the relation of the denotable and the denotative[145] etc.; for the relational knowledge is just the same (in both the cases, viz., the sense-contact and the constructive judgment).[146]

(10.17-19). (The Realist's argument). And Vācaspati further argues: "When a substance[147] is qualified by one attribute[148] (and) is grasped (so), (then), this is not apprehended as being qualified by another attribute (or universal)". Indeed, the substance of the thing (or the identity of the substance)[149] is characterized by the attributes.

(11.1). But neither the attributes nor their relation to the substance[150] are identical with the substance itself. (All are separate entities).[151]

(The Buddhist rejoins). (11.2-3). This view is also not sound.[152] (In the Buddhist view), in fact, the apprehension of different attribute(s) is not implied[153] in the non-differentiated (cognition of the thing), since the apprehension of the characterized is entailed in the apprehension of the characteristic only if it is preceded[154] by the knowledge of the difference (between the two, viz., the characterized and the characteristic).

(11.4-5). And further, it is not correct to posit[155] the rule of natural relation between substance and attribute, in the same way as (it is applied to) the cause and effect relation of fire and smoke.[156]

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[153] Read 'āsañjitam'. 'māsañjitam' is apparently a printing error. Cf. below line 12 and *RN.*, p. 57.

[154] puraskṛtya. Lit., having placed before.

[155] kalpanam.

[156] "The reality of relations required as a corollary the stability (sthāyitva) of enduring objects. The Buddhist who denied this stability and converted the existence of every object into a stream of momentary events (kṣaṇikatva) divided all relations into real (vāstava) – that was the relation of Causality between the consecutive moments (kalpita) – and logical – these were the relations of the thing with its attributes and motions superimposed (āropita) upon it by productive imagination (kalpanā = vikalpa-vāsanā)." (See further there). Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 287 n. 3.

(11.5-7) tayor api pramāṇāsiddhatvāt. pramāṇasiddhe ca svabhāvopavarṇanam iti nyāyaḥ.
(11.8-9) yac cātra Nyāyabhūṣaṇena sūryyādigrahaṇe tad upakāryyāśeṣa-vasturāśigrahaṇa-prasañjanam uktam;
(11.9-10) tad abhiprāyānavagāhanaphalam tathā hi tvan mate dharmmadharmmiṇor bhedaḥ upakāralakṣaṇaiva ca pratyāsattiḥ.
(11.11-12) tadopakārakagrahaṇe samānadeśasyaiva dharmmarūpasyaiva copakāryyasya grahaṇam āsañjitam.
(11.13-14) tat katham sūryyopakāryyasya bhinnadeśasya dravyāntarasya vā dṛṣṭavyabhicārasya grahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ saṅgataḥ.
(11.15-18) tasmāt ekadharmmadvāreṇāpi vastusvarūpapratipattau sarvvātmapratīteḥ; kva śabdāntareṇa vidhiniṣedhāvakāśaḥ. asti ca, tasmānna svalakṣaṇasya śabdavikalpa-liṅgapratibhāsitvam iti sthitam.
(11.19-20) nāpi sāmānyam śābdapratyayapratibhāsi. saritaḥ pāre gāvaścarantīti gavādiśabdāt sāsnāśṛṅga
(12.1-3) lāṅgūlādayo'kṣarākāraparikaritāḥ sajātīyabhedāparāmar-

157 svabhāva.
158 "The Buddhists do not admit the transcendental reality of the relation between substance and quality (dharma-dharmi-bhāva). The substance alone is reality, the qualities are construction." Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, II. p. 58 n. 1. See also *PV.*, I. 49, "dharmiṇaḥ siddhau 'siddham kim ataḥ param."
159 A work by the logician Bhāsarvajña, the author of the *Nyāyasāra.* The text of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* "has not yet come to light and our source of information about it is restricted to the quotations found scattered in later works". A. Thakur, *RN.*, Int., p. 25. See also p. 24; Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *HIL.*, p. 358.
160 sūryyādi. The example of the sun seems to indicate the problem of the the relation of the word and its meaning, i.e. to know the word is to know all that it expresses.
161 aśeṣavastu-rāśi.
162 upakāralakṣaṇaiva.
163 The contention seems to be that since the relation between the attribute and the substance is posited to be complimentary (upakāralakṣaṇā pratyāsatti), if A qualifies B, then, by knowing A we shall as well know B only if both reside in the same locus and in some way B also is complimentary to A, for according to the Realists A, B and their R (relation) all are real entities.
164 dṛṣṭavyabhicāra.
165 vastu-svarūpa.
166 Cf. above (7.18-8. 1-4); *BL.*, II. p. 264 (88.25); S. Varma, *JRAS.* (1929). p. 30; *PVS.*, pp. 384-385.

(11.5-7). For surely the two (the substance and the attribute) are not validly established (as two separate entities). And it is logically correct that (you can) describe reality[157] (only) when it has been validly established.[158]

(11.8-9). (The Realistic view of the "Nyāyabhūṣaṇa").[159] And here it is said in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa that the apprehension of the sun[160] etc. entails the apprehension of the whole of the collection[161] of things that are qualified by it (the sun), (and thus with the perception of the qualifier, i.e., one universal, all individuals can be apprehended).

(11.9-10). (The Buddhist rejoins). This (the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa's argument) is the result of not understanding (the Buddhist) intention (properly). Thus, in your view there is (a real) difference between the attribute and the substance and they are cognized as related by qualifying relation only.[162]

(11.11-12). Thus, (in your opinion) the cognition of the qualifier entails the cognition of only that qualificand which resides in the same locus (in which resides its qualifier) and which is (it-self) only a form of an attribute.[163]

(11.13-14). In that case, it may be asked: How can (your statement) be regarded as 'consistent' if its inconsistency is (so) apparent?[164] For (in your example) the apprehension of such a thing is involved which, although residing in a place or a substance different from the sun, is still qualified by it.

(11.15-18). Because, (you assert that) if we investigate a particular thing[165] by means of one of its attributes, it is known in its entirety. (It may be asked, then) what scope is there for other positive or negative statements concerning it? However, there are (asti) (affirmative and negative propositions concerning, e.g., a tree); thence it is established that "it is not the thing-in-itself which is reflected in the words, 'judgments and logic'. (For these refer only to logical synthesis and constructive imagination, but not to "sensation" or direct perception).[166]

(11.19-20). Moreover, universals do not form the *prime facie* (mental) content of words. For instance, in the proposition "cows are grazing (caranti) across the river", –

(12.1-3). since there is here no consideration of individuals belong-

śanāt sampiṇḍitaprāyāḥ pratibhāsante. na ca tad eva sāmānyam.
(12.4) varṇākṛty akṣarākāraśūnyaṅgotvam hi kathyate.[f]
(12.5-7) tad eva ca sāsnāśṛṅgādimātram akhilavyaktāv atyantavilakṣaṇam api svalakṣaṇenaikīkriyamāṇam sāmānyam ity ucyate. tādṛśasya vāhyasyāprāpter bhrāntir evāsau keśapratibhāsavat.
(12.8) tasmād vāsanāvaśād buddher eva tad ātmanā vivarttoyam astu,
(12.9) asad eva vā tadrūpam khyātu;
(12.10-11) vyaktaya eva vā sajātīyabhedatiraskāreṇānyathā bhāsantām anubhavavyavadhānāt;
(12.11) smṛtipramoṣo vābhidhīyatām.
(12.12) sarvvathā nirvviṣayaḥ khalv ayam sāmānyapratyayaḥ; kva sāmānyavārttā?
(12.13-14) yat punaḥ sāmānyābhāve sāmānyapratyayasyākasmikatvam uktam tad ayuktam.

[f] Complete verse occurs in Dharmakīrti's *PV.*, III. 147:
'yadyapy anvayivijñānam śabdavyakty avabhāsi tat.
varṇṇākṛty akṣarākāraśūnyam gotvam hi varṇṇayate.'

[167] sampiṇḍitaprāyāḥ.

[168] Translation of the complete verse in Dharmakīrti's *PV.*, III. 147, is as follows: "Although the affirmative cognition of an universal is that which appears in the apprehension of the name (or word) (cow) and the individual (body cow), it is, indeed, defined as ... (as above translated)." In this verse, according to Prof. A. Thakur in a letter to me, "Dharmakīrti gives the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view about Universals."

[169] For the Realist view see *BL.*, II, p. 274 n. 9.

[170] keśa. Dharmakīrti in *PV.*, III. 503-505, refuting Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's view of *pratyabhijñā* or "this is that", says that although the judgment "this is that" arises in the perception of newly grown hair, of a ball repeatedly produced by a magician and of ever new flames of a candle, this is in fact not a perception, as the Mīmāṃsaka believes. "This is that" — involves the imposition of the attribute which is previously experienced and now remembered and due to this imposition there is an illusion or failure of apprehension of difference between the first point instant of reality and the second, the third and so forth. See also, Rāhula Sānkṛtyāyana, *DD.*, p. 798.

[171] vivartta.

[172] vāsanā. Cf. *BL.*, II, p. 418 n. 11; *PVS.*, pp. 319, 374, *PV.*, I. 207-208.

[173] asadeva.

[174] anubhava-vyavadhāna. Cp. above f.n. 170.

[175] smṛti-pramoṣa = pramoṣa = viparyaya - jñānam = vivekākhyāti. This is Prabhākara's view. Cf. *PKM.*, p. 54; "tacca (rajatajñānam) smaranamapi

ing to the same class – they appear, as it were, brought together into one (unidentified) mass[167] of dewlaps, horns, and tails, etc. by the image of the letters (akṣarākāra) (*c-o-w*). And this (mass) is (certainly) not a universal (even in terms of the realistic definition).
(12.4). A universal is, indeed, defined (by the Realists) (as a distinct transcendental reality) to be distinguished from the colour and shape (of the cow) (and) the letters (constituting the term "c-o-w").[168]
(12.5-7). And (thus) this is called "the universal" (by the Realists): The mere (form of) the dewlap and horn etc., which resides in all (the multitudes of) its individuals. Although it is absolutely distinct from them, it is capable of coalescing with the particular individuals.[169] (But) since in an external (objective) form, no such "thing" (universal) is perceived, it is indeed, a (mere) illusion, like the appearance of a (new) hair.[170]
(12.8). Thus, let this circularity[171] be resolved (by admitting) the (universal) as an internal mental construction due to our (eternal) habit[172] (of coalescing dissimilar particulars as similar in the mind by excluding a common counter-correlate).
(12.9) Or let its form be known as merely unreal.[173]
(12.10-11). Or let it be the erroneous appearance of the neglected difference of the (extreme) particulars belonging to the same class (i.e., possessing similar attributes although they are different), due to their being experienced at different moments.[174]
(12.11). Or we may call it a confusion of memory.[175]
(12.12). (Thus), in all cases[176] the cognition[177] of the universal corresponds to nothing in reality.[178] How can, then, we talk about the reality of the universal?
(12.13-14). And again, the objection (of the Realist) that the knowledge of the universal, without its corresponding reality, would become accidental[179] cognition, is not correct.

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svarūpeṇa nāvabhāsata iti smṛti (śūktikāyām) pramoṣo'bhidhīyate (Prabhākareṇa)." And cf. also Pt. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, (Hindi) Int., *ibid.*, p. 23.

176 sarvathā.

177 pratyaya or understanding.

178 nirviṣayaḥ. Lit., having no corresponding object.

179 ākasmika.

(12.14-16) yataḥ pūrvvapiṇḍadaṇḍadarśanasmaraṇasahakāriṇātiricyamānāviśeṣapratyayajanikā sāmagri nirvviṣayam sāmānyavikalpam utpādayati.
(12.16-18) tad evanna śābdapratyaye jātiḥ pratibhāti; nāpi pratyakṣe na cānumānato'pi siddhiḥ; adṛśyatve pratibaddhaliṅgādarśanāt.
(12.19) nāpīndriyavad asyāḥ siddhiḥ.
(13.1) jñānakāryyataḥ kādācitkasy aiva nimittāntarasya siddheḥ.
(13.1-5) yadāpi piṇḍāntare antarāle vā gobuddher abhāvam darśayet; tadā śāvaleyādisakalagopiṇḍānām evābhāvād abhāvo gobuddher upapadyamānaḥ katham arthāntaram ākṣipet? gotvād eva gopiṇḍaḥ, anyathā turagopi gopiṇḍaḥ syāt.
(13.5-7) yady evam gopiṇḍād eva gotvam anyathā turagatvam api gotvam syāt. tasmāt kāraṇaparamparāta eva gopiṇḍo gotvam tu bhavatu mā vā.
(13.8-11) nanu sāmānyapratyayajananasāmarthyaṃ yady ekasmāt

180 aviśeṣapratyaya-janikā-sāmagrī.
181 atiricyamāṇā.
182 sahakāriṇā.
183 It should be remembered that the Realists regard the universal (sāmānya) as a perceptual reality, perceived through the individual body in which it inheres. Cf. Keith's *Atomism.*, pp. 75-76.
184 kādācitkasya.
185 The contention seems to be that on the basis of things which are different because of their causes – we mentally construct their different classes.
186 pindāntare. This perhaps refers to the situation of mutual absence or the anyonyābhāva, in which, for the Realist, there are two separate positive universals in the two opposed entities.
187 antarāle vā. This seems to refer to prāg (prior), pradhvaṃsa (posterior), and atyantābhāva (absolute absence).
188 ākṣipet.
189 That is – since 'not cow' means the absence of cow-ness, how can the negation of cow create another universal viz., lion, horse etc., i.e., everything which is referred to by 'non-cow'? According to the Realist's view it is the absence of the universal cow that is cognized in the cognition of things which are referred to by the term 'non-cow'. But according to the Buddhist this creates a mental universal image of things that are "non-cow".
190 sāmānya-pratyaya-janana-sāmarthyam.
191 That is: – if only one individual, a white cow has the potential efficiency to produce the apprension of cow-ness, and, is not separated from it, then, another individual – a red cow could not have the same efficiency and thus not be differentiated (on the basis of its own class) from universals of horses, lions etc., for all individuals, even of the same class, differ in their causal efficiency or individuality.
192 In the text (13.10). Stop after "sāmānyam"; cf. *RN.*, p. 58.

(12.14-16). Because, (the Buddhist answers) the totality of the causes producing a non-distinct cognition,[180] qualified[181] by the force of the cooperating[182] memory of the previously perceived object, creates a mentally constructed universal which has no corresponding (external) object.

(12.16-18). Thus, the Universal does not appear in a verbal cognition; nor does it arise in sense-perception,[183] nor can it be established (as an entity) from Inference; for it is non-empirical, and there can be no perception of the "reason" (liṅga) containing the invariable concomitant relation.

(12.19). Nor can it be established (as a self determining entity) like the sense-organs.

(13.1). Since it is an effect of the cognitive act, it is established only as something produced[184] of a different cause.[185]

(13.1-5). (The Realist's argument). If the absence of the cognition of a cow is pointed out in (the presence of) another body (non-cow)[186] or (when the cow is removed) by a distance of time and place,[187] then negation is based on the absence of all individual cows, including the spotted, (the red and white ones etc.). (The Realist then asks) since, negation is brought about by the cognition of (absence of the universal) cow, how can negation (of such a characteristic) entail[188] another entity?[189] (Moreover), *A* is said to be the body of (an individual) cow only because it possesses the characteristic of the universal -cow (ness). Otherwise (the term) "the body of the cow" could also refer to a horse.

(13.5-7). (The Buddhist rejoins). If it is true that the universal cow-ness exists because of the body cow, (individual cows), otherwise (the term) 'cow-ness' could also refer to horse-ness, then, from this "does it not follow that the individual cow is, in fact, cow-ness on account of its causal efficiency".

(13.8-11). (The Realist). "If the (causal) efficiency of producing the apprehension of the universal[190] is not separate from one body (individual), then, another body (individual of the same class e.g. a red cow), is not capable of being differentiated from the other class.[191] But if (the efficiency of producing) is separate (from the individual body), then, that very (separate) thing is the universal.[192]

piṇḍād abhinnaṃ; tadā vijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ piṇḍāntaram asamartham. atha bhinnaṃ tadā tad eva sāmānyam. nāmni paraṃ vivāda iti cet?

(13.11-13) abhinnaiva sā śaktiḥ prativastu; yathātv ekaḥ śaktasvabhāvo bhāvaḥ tathā anyopi bhavan kīdṛśan doṣam āvahati? yathā bhavatāṃ.

(13.14-16) jātir ekāpi samānadhvaniprasavahetur anyāpi svarūpeṇaiva jātyantaranirapekṣā. tathāsmākaṃ vyaktir api jātinirapekṣā svarūpeṇaiva bhinnā hetuḥ.

(13.17-19) yattu Trilocanaḥ: aśvatvagotvādīnāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ svāśraye samavāyaḥ sāmānyaṃ; sāmānyam ity abhidhānapratyayayor nimittam iti.

(13.19) yady evaṃ vyaktiṣv apyayam eva tathābhidhānapratyayahetur astu. kiṃ sāmānyasvīkārapramādena.

(14.3-7) na ca samavāyaḥ sambhavī.

iheti buddheḥ samavāyasiddhir
iheti dhīśca dvayadarśane syāt.
na ca kvacit tad viṣaye tv apekṣā,
svakalpanā mātram atobhyupāyaḥ.

[193] śaktasvabhāvaḥ.
[194] āvahati.
[195] The contention seems to be that even if we admit universal as the meaning of term or word, we have to accept it as *the* particular universal in it-self independent of other universals. Therefore, according to the Buddhist view the meaning of a word is differentiative or discriminative – a particular excluded from a common characteristic. For postulation of a separate universal entity serves no purpose. Cf. *PV.*, I. 99: "vyavacchedo' sti cedasya nanvetāvat prayojanam. śabdānām iti kim tatra sāmānyenāpareṇa vaḥ." See also, Rāhula Sānkṛtyāyana, *DD.*, p. 789.
[196] Amongst the Naiyayikas, after Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, Trilocana is the third dominant figure to receive special attention of Ratnakīrti and his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra. It is well established that Trilocana was the guru of Vācaspatimiśra, Cf. *NVTT.*, p. 133; Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 258 n. 3. Thakur, "The Naiyāyika Trilocana as a Teacher of Vācaspati", *Indian Culture*, XIV. No. I. p. 36ff.; Prasad, *HIE.*, p. 249; Sinha, *HIP.*, I. p. 452; Radhakrishnan, *IP.*, II. p. 57. A *Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā* has also been ascribed to him by Dūrvekamiśra, *Dharmottarpradīpa*, p. 173; *RN.*, Int.; p. 26 n. 4.
[197] sāmānya-viśeṣāṇām.
[198] vyaktiṣu.
[199] sāmānyasvīkāra.

(Thus), the greatest controversy is only about the name (universal, not about its contents ".

(13.11-13). (The Buddhist). (To this view our answer is as follows): That efficiency is, indeed, conjoined in each thing (individual): just as one existent thing has its natural efficiency[193] so the other (individual) can also have (its own natural efficiency); what discrepancy can be caused?[194] As in your (Realist's) view, (13.14-16). although Universal is only one (and still) is the cause of creating various similar (universal) sounds (i.e. cow-ness, horse-ness etc.), (and) other universals are also independent of different universals by their own self-nature; so in our (Buddhist) view – the individual (momentary extreme particular) is also independent of the universal (and) is a separate cause (of another momentary particular) by its self-nature.[195]

(13.17-19). Now the argument of Trilocana[196] (is as follows): "The particular universals,[197] such as horse-ness etc., are related to their loci (individuals or substances) by Inherence, a universal relation. (Thus), "Universal" is the cause (nimittam) of names and concepts (abhidhāna-pratyayor = word and its cognitive meaning).

(13.19-). (The Buddhist). If it were true then in particulars[198] also (there is the inherence relation and) we might agree that (inherence) is the cause of names and concepts; but why commit the error (pramāda) of admitting the universal (as real)?[199] (Problem: are universals causes of other universals, or do the universals inhere in other universals?)

(14.3-7). Moreover, the inherence relation cannot be established (as an independent real entity). (Since it is maintained by the Realist that) Inherence is established because there is a judgment such as, "(this is in-) here". And the cognition "(this is in-) here" is based on the perception of two (facts). And thus there is nowhere dependence on that object ("inherence") in order to know for instance, that *A* inheres in *B*. (Inherence) is therefore, merely an *expediency* (abhyupāyaḥ), of our conceptual construction.[200]

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[200] That is the perception or sensation has only a single object (svalakṣaṇa) not two on the basis of which constructive concepts such as, universals, inherence etc. are formed or imagined.

(14.8-10) etena yeyaṃ pratyayānuvṛttir anuvṛttavastv anuyāyinī katham atyantabhedinīṣu vyaktiṣu vyāvṛttaviṣayapratyayabhāvānupātinīṣu bhavitum arhatīty ūhā-pravarttanam asya pratyākhyātam.

(14.11-12) jātiṣv eva parasparavyāvṛttatayā vyaktīyamānāsv anuvṛttapratyayena vyabhicārāt.

(14.12-14) yat punar anena viparyyaye vādhakam uktam, abhidhānapratyayānuvṛttiḥ kutaś cin nivṛttya kvacid eva bhavantī nimittavatī. na cānyannimittam ityādi.

(14.15-17) tan na samyak. anuvṛttam antareṇāpi abhidhānapratyay ānuvṛtter atadrūpaparāvṛtta-svarūpaviśeṣāt avaṣaṃ svīkārasya sādhitatvāt. tasmāt:

(14.18-19) tulya bhede yayā jātiḥ pratyāsattyā prasarpati.
kvacin nānyatra saivāstu śabda jñānanibandhanam.[8]

(14.20) yat punar atra Nyāyabhūṣaṇenoktaṃ nahy evaṃ bhavati.

(15.1-3) yayā pratyāsattyā daṇḍasūtrādikaṃ prasarpati kvacin

[8] The verse occurs in Dharmakīrti's *PV.*, I. 164 (Gnoli's ed. I. 162). Also see E. Frauwallnar, *WZKM.*, Vol. 40, p. 79, and Text Vol. 37, p. 283.

[201] ūhā = ūha or consideration, examination, inference etc.

[202] pratyākhyātam.

[203] anuvṛtti-anuvṛtta.

[204] katham bhavitum arhati.

[205] pratyayabhāva.

[206] vyāvṛttaviṣaya.

[207] anupātinīṣu.

[208] atyantabhedinīṣu.

[209] This means that according to the Realist the particulars are known by the real universals (their class characters) and the universals are determined by their corresponding particulars. This would involve mutual dependency. According to the Buddhists, the universals are logically constructed on the basis of the extreme particulars.

[210] nimittavatī.

[211] This verse is found in *PV.*, I. 164 (G. ed. 1.162). For translation see E. Frauwallner, *WZKM.*, Vol. 40, p. 79, and the text, Vol. 37, p. 283.

[212] pratyāsatti. Karṇakogomin, *PVST.*, p. 320, explains the term by "bhāvaśakti lakṣaṇā".

[213] prasarpati = vyāpya vartate. Cf. *PVST.*, Karṇaka., p. 320.

[214] kvacit.

[215] pratyāsatti = anyāpoha. The relational cognition by which, absolutely different individuals, e.g., horses, lions, camels, etc., due to a common countercorrelate, i.e., cow, are apprehended as belonging to one class, viz., non-cow (x). Thus it is only the logical mentally constructed relational knowledge

(14.8-10). (The Buddhist continues). The contention[201] of the Realist is rejected.[202] (The realist asserts that) there is a direct continuity[203] between the concrete objects (particulars) and their corresponding concepts (= the universals which inhere in the particulars). (This view is rejected by the following question): How is this possible,[204] if the (conceptual) cognition[205] of the distinct objects[206] results[207] from the extreme unique particulars[208] (given in sensation).[209]

(14.11-12). This inconsistency arises only in (the realist view of) universals, (where the universals correspond to) the apprehension of the positive extended object. Thus, (the universals) themselves become particular universals by mutually excluding each other.

(14.12-14). This again is refuted (by the Realist): "It cannot be admitted that the cognition (of universals) is illusory, for the concrete conceptual content of terms (or names) is caused[210] by a given time and place and therefore from some other extension (or affirmation). And (thus) (an affirmation of words and concepts) cannot be (negatively) the cause of something else (i.e. the anyāpoha, the discrimination of the other, the *non-A*)".

(14.15-17). (The Buddhist). This is not correct. Because, even without the extenstion (or universal affirmation), as the extension of the meaning of the term, the particular *A* is identical with its self-character (and) distinguished from the form of all that is *non-A*. (Thus, the differentiation – not the positive universal affirmation) must be accepted (as the meaning of the term), for this is established as such. Thence, (Dharmakīrti said):[211]

(14.18-19). "The name relational knowledge[212] (or class connection) by which the class, – in spite of the sameness of the difference – occurs[213] in certain[214] (particulars) – and not in other ones, may also be the cause of words and concepts.[215]

(14.20). (The Realist). Here again the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa objects by saying that this (the Buddhist view) is not correct.[216]

(15.1-3). "The relational knowledge by which terms such as stick, thread, etc. occur (only) in some particular instances and not in

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(pratyāsatti) or the exclusion of other entities (anyāpoha) which brings about a so-called universal cognition. Cp. Sinha, *HIP*., pp. 331-333.

[216] na hyevam bhavati. Lit., It does not happen in this way.

nānyatra saiva pratyāsattiḥ puruṣasphaṭikādiṣu daṇḍi-sūtritv ādi vyavahāranibandhanam astu, kiṃ daṇḍa-sūtrādineti.
(15.3) tad asaṃgatam.
(15.4-7) daṇḍa-sūtrayor hi puruṣasphaṭika-pratyāsannayoḥ? dṛṣṭa-yoḥ daṇḍisūtripratyayahetutvam nāpalapyate. sāmānyantu svap-ne'pi na dṛṣṭam tad yadīdaṃ parikalpanīyaṃ tadā varaṃpratyā-sattir eva sāmānyapratyayahetuḥ parikalpyatāṃ,
(15.7) kiṃ gurvyā parikalpanay ety
(15.8) abhiprāya aparijñānāt.
(15.9) athedaṃ jātiprasādhakam anumānam abhidhīyate.
(15.10-12) yad viśiṣṭajñānañcedaṃ tad viśeṣaṇāgrahaṇanāntarīya-kam. yathā daṇḍijñānam. viśiṣṭajñānañcedaṃ gaur ayam ityartha-taḥ kāryyahetuḥ. viśeṣaṇānubhavakāryyaṃ hi dṛṣṭānte viśiṣṭa-buddhiḥ siddheti.

[217] daṇḍi(tva). Lit. (a person) being in possession of a stick.
[218] sūtritva. Lit. (a crystal bead) being threaded.
[219] The contention is that if there were *no real relation* between a qualifier and the qualified, e.g., a person and the stick, how could the conceptualist (Buddhist) create the cognition of their relation by mere mentally constructed logical relational knowledge?

other, that same relational knowledge may determine the pragmatic usage of (such terms as) "the person qualified by a stick"[217] (= a staff holder) and "crystal (bead) qualified by thread"[218] (in a necklace) etc.[219] rather than (the non-empirical usage of) "thread qualified by stick" etc.
(15.3). (The Buddhist rejoins). The objection is not applicable to our (Buddhist) view.
(15.4-7). (We Buddhists) do not reject the stick and thread, *perceived* in close relation with the person and the crystal (ball), as being the reason of judgment of 'the person-with-the-stick and the threaded-crystal'. But a universal is not perceived even in a dream (and this we reject). And if this (universal) is to be accepted as an imaginative (entity), then, rather presume (or imagine) the relational- knowledge alone as the *reason* of cognition of a universal.
(15.7). What purpose is to be served by the unnecessary burden of postulation of an extra universal entity?
(15.8). (The objection of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa) is due (only) to lack of (proper) understanding of (the Buddhist theory of Differentiation).
(15.9). (The Realist). Now, further, it is asserted that universal (as the meaning of a word) is established by Inference.
(15.10-12). (This inference can be explained in the following syllogism).

(Major Premiss): Whenever there is cognition of the qualified *A*, it is invariably concomitant with perception of the attribute that qualifies it (*A*).

(Example): The cognition of the person-with-stick (daṇḍin), and (the judgmental perception) "This is a cow". This is (also) a qualified cognition.

(Reason): The *reason* being the Causality of the meaning (of the term cow).

(Conclusion): In the example, the cognition of the qualified is, indeed, the effect of the perception of the qualifier (an attribute or universal cowness). This (i.e. the positive meaning of the term 'cow' is the universal cow) is established.

(15.13-14) atrānuyogaḥ, viśiṣṭabuddher bhinnaviśeṣaṇa-grahaṇa-nāntarīyaktvaṃ vā sādhyam; viśeṣaṇamātrānubhavanāntarīya-katvaṃ vā.

(15.15-19) prathampakṣe pakṣasya pratyakṣavādhā-sādhanāva-dhānamanavakāśayati. vastugrāhiṇaḥ pratyakṣasyobhayapratibhā-sābhāvāt. viśiṣṭabuddhitvañca sāmānyam. hetur anaikāntikaḥ. bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇam antareṇāpi darśanāt. yathā svarūpavān ghaṭaḥ. gotvam sāmānyam iti vā.

(16.1-4) dvitīyapakṣe tu siddhasādhanam. svarūpavān ghaṭa ityādivat gotvajātimān piṇḍa iti parikalpitam bhedam upādāya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasyeṣṭatvād agovyāvṛttānubhavabhāvitvādgaur ayam iti vyavahārasya.

(16.5) tad eva na sāmānyabuddhiḥ.

(16.5-6) vādhakam ca sāmānyaguṇakarmmādy upādhicakrasya, kevalavyaktigrāhakaṃ paṭupratyakṣam.

(16.7) dṛśyānupalambho vā prasiddhaḥ.

[220] anuyogaḥ.
[221] sādhyaḥ.
[222] pakṣaḥ.
[223] pratyakṣa-vādhā-sādhanāvadhānam anavakāśayati. I am unable to give a literal rendering of the passage.
[224] The Buddhist holds that entities are unitary, i.e., they comprise both the characterized (dharmin) and the characteristic or property (dharma). Thus according to him the two are perceived simultaneously through the same sense-organ. Cf. Dignāga's *P. Samuccaya-vṛtti.*, p. 59; "yatra viśeṣyaviśeṣa-ṇabhāvaḥ tatra samānendriya-gocaratvam."
[225] Lit., "Universal is the qualified cognition."
[226] hetur-anaikāntikaḥ.
[227] siddha-sādhanam.
[228] jāti.
[229] bhāvitva.
[230] Paṭupratyakṣa = paṭupratyaya. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas cognitions reproduced in memory through reminiscent impressions are three-fold: (a) paṭupratyaya or vivid cognition – "a normal type of cognition which involves the minimum degree of attention sufficient to ensure reproduction in memory"; (b) abhyāsapratyaya or "repetitional cognition" – "repretedly revolving a certain idea in one's mind"; (c) ādarapratyaya or "regardful cognition" – in which "one's mind gets riveted to a wonderful or extraordinary object." Cf. Kuppuswami Sāstri, *Primer*, pp. 144-145.
[231] bādhakam.
[232] upādhi-cakrasya.
[233] These are three out of the seven ultimate entities or categories (padārtha) accepted by the Realists (*NV.*), but rejected by the Buddhists who believe in momentary (kṣaṇika) reality.

(15.13-14). (The Buddhist). (But there are two ways of interpreting the Major term). Here is the explanation[220] of the major term:[221] (a) the cognition of the qualified *A* is being produced concomitantly with the perception of the qualifier (which is a separate entity); or whether (b) the cognition of the qualified (*A*) is being produced concomitantly with the mere experience (i.e. imaginative reproduction) of the qualifier (universal)?

(15.15-19). (The Buddhist continues). In the former (a) view, the perception of the occurance of the major term[222] (the qualified) is not possible,[223] for the sense-perception, when grasping (one) object (at one time instant), cannot reflect the cognition of two (separate entities).[224] And (the reason given by the Realist for admitting a separate) universal entity is the cognition of the qualified.[225] (But) this reason is *inconclusive.*[226] For (a qualified cognition) is seen to be possible even without perceiving a qualifier separate (from the qualified). For example: (in the statement) "A jar is the possessor of its own character (or nature)". Or "The universal (of cow) is (its) cow-ness". (We do not apprehend a qualifier universal as separate from the individual).

(16.1-4). (The Buddhist continues). And in the latter (b) view there is a *petitio principii.*[227] (We say), "The body (of the cow) is the possessor of the genus[228] cow (i.e. "cow-ness"), just as (we say) "the jar is the possessor of its own character". For (in all such statements) division of the qualifier and the qualificand is intended (by the Buddhist) to be based on imaginary difference (between the two), since a proposition such as "this is a cow" is based[229] on the experience of exclusion of all that is *non-cow.*

(16.5). This, indeed, is not the cognition of universal.

(16.5-6). And what we perceive in *clear perception*[230] is only *the* particular and this fact precludes[231] admission of the (vicious) *circle* of (realistic pluralism) engendered by such imposed realities[232] as, universals, attributes, actions[233] etc.

(16.7). Or the theory of *non-perception* of the perceptible[234] is well

[234] The contention is that in the judgment "this is a cow", we exclude 'non-cow' on the basis of non-perception of a perceptible non-cow i.e., a horse, lion,

(16.8-10) tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ. sa ca vāhyortho buddhyākāraśca vivakṣitaḥ, tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ samvṛtyā vā vidhiniṣedhau. svasamvedanapratyakṣagamyatvāt.
(16.11) anadhyavasāyāc ca.
(16.11-13) nāpi tattvato vāhyasyāpi vidhiniṣedhau tasya śābde pratyaye'pratibhāsanāt. ataeva sarvvadharmmāṇān tattvato'nabhilāpyatvaṃ pratibhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt.
(16.14-15) tasmāt vāhyasyaiva sāmvṛtau vidhiniṣedhau. anyathā samvyavahārahāniprasaṅgāt. tad evam.
(16.16-17) nākārasya na vāhyasya tattvato vidhisādhanam. vahir eva hi samvṛtyā samvṛtyāpi tu nākṛteḥ.

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etc. Thus, the exclusion or negation is not real but only a relative and logical synthesis. A lion is a positive entity but only with relation to a 'cow', it is apprehended as 'non-cow' or non-existent. (Cf. *PVS.*, 31, 'anyasattayā asattā', and Karṇakagomin thereon). Thus, according to the Buddhist what is affirmed and denied is not the universal but the particular. The Buddhist theory of negation is comparable to that of Bradley. Also see Dhirendra Sharma, "The Paradox of Negative Judgment and Indian Logic", *Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal*, Vol. II. pt. i (March 1964).

235 vidhireva.

236 buddhyākāraḥ.

237 bāhyārthaḥ.

238 samvṛtyā samvṛtti = svasamvedanā. See *PVST.*, p. 121; *PVP.*, p. 573: samvṛttisadeva dharmi-dharmalakṣaṇam. Cf. Stcherbatsky's rendering of "Dignāga's Aphorism, *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, I. 10 and his Own Comment", *BL.*, II, Appendix IV, pp. 384ff. and 385 n. 6f. on p. 386. Dharmottara in *NBT.*, p. 11 6ff. defines 'svasamvedanā' as 'jñānasya anubhava' and the term has also been explained as synonymous with 'svasamvitti'. "The 'feeling' of the presence in us of a perception is evidently conceived as belonging to the emotional sphere and is put on the same level as the feeling of pleasure or ease. Jinandrabuddhi also explains it as 'ses-pa-yi ni ses-pa = jñānasya jñānam' (cp. *MDo.*, vol. 115 f. 37b. 1), with reference to Dignāga's words that the result of cognition is self-consciousness (svasamvitti), a feeling of something either desirable or undesirable". The reader may see the footnote in full for a clear explanation of the problem of knowledge with regard to these terms of Buddhist logic. On the authority of Stcherbatsky we are inclined to understand the term expressing a passive cognition as against the act of cognizing.

239 A verbal cognition, according to the Buddhist, produces only the reflexion of an ideal image of the external object; it does not reflect the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa) which is momentary. Cf. *BL.*, II, pp. 405-406, "Names are connotative of Mental Construction of Universals."

240 That is everything in the universe which is referred to by the term *non-A* or anyāpoha.

known to substantiate (the Buddhist view of "Differentiation" without resorting to universal entities).

(16.8-10). (The Buddhist continues). Hence, the meaning of a term is indeed affirmative.[235] That is, it is said to be a configuration,[236] as well as an external objective meaning.[237] In this context, affirmation and negation are applicable to the configuration (which is a passive cognition) neither in reality, nor in internal feeling (for it is neither to be desired nor to be not desired),[238] for the self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception

(16.11). and is non-constructive (whereas affirmation and negation are acts of constructive or judgmental active cognition).

(16.11-13). Nor is the external object really affirmed, or denied, for it is not reflected (i.e. it does not appear in the verbal cognition).[239] Hence, we cannot really talk about (or apprehend) all the attributes[240] (of a substance), for there can be no reflexion (of their sense-contact) nor (is) a judgmental apprehension (a sensation).[241]

(16.14-15). Thus what is affirmed and denied is only the idea of an external object. Otherwise no pragmatic purpose would possibly be served.[242] Thence:

(16.16-17). Neither the external object (i.e., an individual) nor (its) ideal image (universal) can really be designated as the (only) positive (meaning of a term). (A term refers to) an external object, indeed, only because of its "feeling" but their combination is not (externally referred to) even on the (basis of) the "feeling".[243]

[241] The terms *pratibhāsa* and *adhyayasāya* have been explained by Ratnakīrti in *Citrādvaita-prakaśavādaḥ*, *RN*., p. 130 in the following words: "dvividho hi viṣaya-vyavahāraḥ, pratibhāsād adhyavasāyāśca. tadiha pratibhāsābhāve' pi parāpoḍha-svalakṣaṇāder-adhyavasāya-mātreṇa viṣayatvam uktam. sarvathā nirviṣayatve pravṛtti-nivṛttyādi sakala-vyavahāroccheda-prasaṅgāt ...; see also pp. 68, 85, 124.

[242] Lit., "It would involve (prasaṅga) infringment (hani) of (our daily) behaviour". It should be remembered that the Buddhist logician regards 'efficient behaviour' as the ultimate authority. And since he admits a momentary reality (external) he cannot be called "Idealist" in the strict sense of the word.

[243] Cf. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 408 (339.6) and n. 3. "... This view is contrasted with the stand-point of naive realism according to which universals (ākāra = jāti), particulars (svalakṣaṇa = vyakti) and their combinations (sāmānyavadbheda = ākṛti) are all external real objects cognized by special contacts with the senses."

(16.18) etena yad Dharmmottaraḥ: āropitasya vāhyatvasya.
(17.1-2) vidhiniṣedhāv ity alaukikam anāgamam atārkikīyaṃ kathayati. tad apahastitam.[h]
(17.3-4) nanv adhyavasāye yady adhyavaseyaṃ vastu na sphurati tadā tad adhyavasitam iti ko'rthaḥ?
(17.4-5) apratibhāse'pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam iti yo'rthaḥ.
(17.5-6) apratibhāsāviśeṣe viṣayāntaraparihāreṇa kathan niyataviṣayā pravṛttir iti cet?
(17.7-10) ucyate: yady api viśvam agṛhītaṃ tathāpi vikalpasya niyatasāmagrīprasūtatvena niyatākāratayā niyataśaktitvāt niyatā eva jalādau pravṛttiḥ. dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajananavat.
(17.11-12) niyataviṣayā hi bhāvāḥ pramāṇapariniṣṭhita-svabhāvāḥ śaktisāṅkaryyaparyyanuyogabhājaḥ.

[h] Read: apahasitam.
[244] See Dharmottara's view, *ibid.* (339.7), n. 4. Dharmottara "has written a special work on Apoha" (Bstan-hgyur, *Mdo*, vol. 112) which is not extant in Sanskrit. Stcherbatsky, *ibid.*, 404.
[245] alaukika. Cf. *supra*, footnote 242.
[246] anāgamam.
[247] atārkikīyam.
[248] 'arthaḥ' here means object
[249] arthaḥ.
[250] pravṛtti.
[251] For a propositional attitude, the presence or perception of an object is not necessary.
[252] aviśeṣa = sāmānya. That is, for a determinate cognition, according to the Realist, first we must have an indeterminate cognition.
[253] niyata.
[254] niyata-śaktitvāt. śakti = abhidā. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 112 n. 6.
[255] From this example it is clear that Apoha or differentiation is a logical construction (adhyavasāya) just as Inference is. As in inference we need not have perceived all the similar and dissimilar (pakṣa-vipakṣa) instances; just on the basis of the *a priori* (i.e., the three laws of Reason, viz: Negation, Identity and Causation; NB., II. 12) we arrive at the conclusion; so also with Apoha. We need not have perceived all the instances of *non-A*, in order to determine *A*. Exclusion of *non-A* is determined by the causality of *A* and this apprehension is a logical construction. Cf. *RN.*, p. 67, "agṛhīte' pi vastuni mānasyādipravṛttikāraktvam vikalpasyādhyavasāyitvam." (*SBNT.*, *kṣaṇabhaṃga-siddhiḥ*, p. 33).
[256] Cf. *RN.*, p. 131, 'niyata-śaktayo bhāvā hi pramāṇa-pariniṣṭhita-svabhāvāḥ ...'. The problem discussed on this page (*AS.* 17) has been discussed by the author again in detail in his other essay on the problem of Error "citrādvaitaprakāśavāda", *RN.*, pp. 130, 131. With a slight variance, the whole passage (17.7-18) re-occurs there.
[257] bhājaḥ.

(16.18). By this (above exposition) Dharmottara's view
(17.1-2). has been rejected (in which he says): "Affirmation and negation refer to (quasi) external thing, the externality (or objectivity) of which is superimposed".[244] (Ratnakīrti criticizes his fellow Buddhist for advancing) the arguments which are unrealistic,[245] against the authority of the Buddhist writings,[246] and illogical.[247]
(17.3-4). (The Realist). "If there is no objective (external) entity to be apprehended that reflects in (the corresponding) cognition, then, what is intended (when we say) '*A* has been judged' "(In the judgment 'this is *A*')?"[248]
(17.4-5). (The Buddhist). "The same thing[249] that is the object of a propositional attitude[250] even when there is no object to reflect (in sense-perception)".[251]
(17.5-6). (The Realist). "How can there be a propositional attitude about a determined object, by exclusion (or negation) of (all) other objects (*non-A*), (so long as) (first) there is no reflexion of a common (non-discriminated = universal) reality?"[252] (It is universal that determines a particular).
(17.7-10). (The Buddhist). We answer: just as, our propositional attitude concerning such entities as "water" etc., is indeed, determinate,[253] although (we) have not perceived the entire Universe (in contrast to "water" etc.), similarly the direct expressive force of the word[254] is determined by the ideal image (of water) which is determinate; (therefore) the judgment (a cognitive act) is being produced from a totality of determinate causes. (For example) just as the cognition of an unperceived fire is produced from the perception of smoke.[255]
(17.11-12). Things (extreme-point-instants) are determined by their causal efficiency;[256] their identity (or self nature) is based on valid *means* of knowledge (perception) (and thus), they are not subject[257] to being mixed[258] because of confusion of efficiency.[259]

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[258] paryyanuyoga.
[259] That is, if several particulars really belonged to one universal, their distinct causal efficiency would not remain distinct. Ratnakīrti explains this distinctness of individuals by the examples of sprout from the seed and heat from fire. Cf. *ibid*.

(17.13) tasmāt tad adhyavasāyitvam ākāraviśeṣayogāt tat pravṛttijanakatvam.
(17.14-15) na ca sādṛśyād āropeṇa pravṛttiṃ brūmaḥ. yen ākāre vāhyasya vāhye vā ākārasy āropadvāreṇa dūṣaṇāvakāśaḥ.
(17.16-18) kintarhi svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva buddhir apaśyanty api vāhyam vāhye vṛttim ātanotīti viplutaiva.
(17.18) tad evam anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivyāvṛtto'rtho vidhiḥ.
(18.1-2) sa eva cāpohaśabdavācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ pravṛttinivṛttiviṣayaśceti sthitam.
(18.3-5) atra prayogaḥ. yad vācakaṃ tat sarvvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛtta vastumātra-gocaram. yatheha kūpe jalam iti vacanam. vācakañcedaṃ gavādiśabdarūpam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.

260 yogāt.
261 janaka. Lit., producer or creator.
262 The contention of the Buddhist view is that although the external momentary object (svalakṣaṇa) is not present in the conceptual contention of the term or word, on the basis of its ideal image it is determined by "the exclusion of others" in the judgmental cognition. Now the question arises whether the similarity of the ideal image is imposed upon the external object, or vice versa? For the momentary thing is not present and only on the basis of its image do we apprehend its determination and the exclusion of others. (This question has been posed by Ratnakīrti *ibid.* "nanu ca sādṛśyāropeṇa kim svākārasya bāhye svākāre vā bāhyasyāropaḥ" "ubhayāthāpyasaṅgatiḥ. āropāropaviṣayayoḥ svākāra-bāhyayorgrahaṇasambhavād iti cit.") In either way, imposition hypothesis is not correct, for in the judgment we do not apprehend two things, i.e. the image and the eternal object as the object of imposition and the thing to be imposed. The Buddhist answers "we do not say ..." (see above).
263 kintarhi.
264 viplutaiva.
265 Cf. *PV.* IV. 234, Stcherbatsky's comments are noteworthy: *op. cit.*, p. 418 n. 11f. 419, "The Universals are not external, they are internal mental constructions, but their difference from the external points of reality is overlooked and we, through an inveterate habit, (anādi-vāsanā) deem them to be external. The external world is, moreover, split in discrete point-instants which are "particulars", i.e., individually distinct, discontinuous. Purposive action of sentient beings is directed towards some point when it is similar to what has been previously experienced by them as pleasant. The Universal, the image, cannot attract our action because it is unreal; inefficient; neither can the particular do so because it is unique and dissimilar. The problem is solved by assuming a "coordination" (sārūpya) between the point-instant of reality and the imagined Universal. But this coordination consists in a negative similarity (anyavyāvṛtti = apoha = sārūpya). Just as the Universal "cow" is nothing but a negation of "non-cow", just so the point of efficient reality is also a negation of "non-cow", thus the unity is difference ...."

(17.13). Hence, that (extreme particular reality) is the (ultimate) object of judgmental cognition, for (the judgment) is conjoined[260] with the particular ideal image (of the point instant real), (and therefore it is the judgment or a mental construct) that directs[261] our purposive action.

(17.14-15). And further, we (Buddhists) do not assert that a propositional attitude is due to the imposition of similarity (of either the ideal image on the external object or vice versa). And thus there is no scope for the criticism that we impose external objects on internal images, or internal images on external objects.[262]

(17.16-18). On the contrary,[263] (we Buddhists) have indeed explained[264] (our position as follows): It (similarity) is the cognition – arising from our illusory inveterate habit[265] which directs (extends)[266] our propositional attitude concerning the external particular reality, even when (we do not) perceive the external thing.

(17.18). Thus, (according to the Buddhist), a positive statement[267] (comprises) *the* particular qualified by the negation of the other (individuals) and discriminated from the class of dissimilar instances (i.e. non-A)[268]

(18.1-2). And, this (qualified positive thing) alone is the direct import of the term "Differentiation", of the meaning of words, and of the object (viṣaya) of (all) affirmation and negation. This is established.

(18.3-5). Here (concerning the theory of Apoha), the syllogistic formula[269] is as follows:

(Major premise). Whatsoever is a denotative term (implies) the cognition of *the* mere positive thing *A*,[270] differentiated from *non-A* in the judgmental construction.[271]

Example: The statement "there is water here (in this) well". (That is distinctly expresses the well, and thus

[266] ātanoti.
[267] vidhiḥ.
[268] The reader is reminded that the class character is only a mental construction for the Buddhist.
[269] prayogaḥ. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 61 n. 2.
[270] vastu.
[271] Cf. *NB.*, I. 5; Translation *BL.*, II, p. 19; *NBT.*, p. 8. 19.

(18.6-8) nāyam asiddhaḥ, pūrvvoktena nyāyena pāramārthikavācya-vācakabhāvasyābhāve'pi; adhyavasāyakṛtasya sarvvavyavahāribhir avaśyasvīkarttavyatvāt.

(18.8-9) anyathā sarvvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgāt. nāpi viruddhaḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt.

(18.10) na cānaikāntikaḥ;[i]

(18.10-12) tathāhi śabdānām adhyavasitavijātivyāvṛttavastumātraviṣayatvam anicchadbhiḥ paraiḥ paramārthato:

(18.13-14) vācyam svalakṣaṇam upādhir upādhiyogaḥ
sopādhir astu yadi vā kṛtir astu buddheḥ,

(18.15) gaty antarābhāvāt. aviṣayatve ca vācakatvāyogāt. tatra:

[i] Stop here and read 'tathā hi ...' as a new sentence. Cp. *RN.*, p. 61.

[272] 'rūpam', here means 'similar to', or 'of that form'.

[273] Cf. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 417 n. 5: "svabhāva-hetuḥ". The judgment "similarity is established by a common contrast, or common negation" is an analytical one, since similarity and common negation are identical.

[274] Cf. *supra* (18.1-2).

[275] asiddhaḥ.

[276] pūrvoktena nyāyena. Cf. *supra* (18.1-2).

[277] paramārthika (sambandha).

[278] vācya-vācakabhāva. Cf. *supra* (10.12-16).

[279] vyavahāribhir. Buddhist pragmatism seems to be similar to that of Peirce. See *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 245.

[280] viruddhaḥ.

[281] anaikāntikaḥ. Stop here and read "tathā-hi ..." as a new sentence. Cf. *RN.*, p. 61.

[282] paraiḥ. It is not clear to whom Ratnakīrti refers here: most probably to some fellow Buddhist philosopher.

[283] upādhiḥ.

[284] upādhiyogaḥ.

[285] gatiḥ. Cf. *NB.*, III. 28, 30.

differentiates it from old and dried wells and also from waters in non-wells).

Reason: The reason is Identity: "This (term 'well') is said to be denotative just as[272] the word 'cow', etc., are, (denotative of their objects)".[273]

Conclusion: (Thus it is established that every denotative term denotes the positive thing qualified by the discrimination of others in the judgmental construction).[274]

(18.6-8). The fallacy of *invalid reasoning*[275] is not applicable here (to the Buddhist view), for, following the aforesaid rule,[276] although (according to the Buddhist) there is no real constant relation[277] (of cause and effect) between the denoted and the denotative,[278] it (the relation) must be admitted by all pragmatists[279] as a logical mental construction.

(18.9). Nor can the fallacy of *incompatibility*[280] (be invoked), for (the relation of the denoted and the denotative) is found (only) in similar instances.

(18.10). Nor is (the reason) inconclusive[281] (for the denotative term 'cow' denotes only the body of the individual cow qualified by non-cow and nothing else).

(18.10-12). However, other philosophers,[282] who do not hold that the object of the word is the (qualified) positive thing alone differentiated from things of another class in the logical mental construction, (such philosophers regard the relation of the word and its meaning) as eternal (real and concomitant), (and their argument is as follows);

(18.13-14). "If (the extreme particular is not really denoted) then, either it is superimposed (as the meaning of the word), or it is (a mere) creation of (our) mind. (Thus in both cases the thing cannot be a real entity).

(In fact), a superimposed (unreal property)[283] is related (or corresponds) to a mental construction (imposition)[284] only (while) the thing-in-itself (particular real) is the object of denotation".

(18.15). (Reason). For there is no other than the concomitant relation[285] (between the word and its meaning). And if (the word)

(18.16-18) ādy antayor nna samayaḥ phalaśaktihāner
madhyepy uhādhivirahāt tritayena yuktaḥ

(18.19) tad evaṃ vācyāntarasyābhāvāt.

(19.1-3) viṣayavattvalakṣaṇasya vyāpakasya nivṛttau vipakṣato nivarttamānaṃ vācakatvam adhyavasitavāhyaviṣayatvena vyāpyata iti vyāptisiddhiḥ.

(19.4-7) śabdais tāvanmukhyam ākhyāyate'rthas
tatrāpohas tad guṇatvena gamyaḥ.
arthaś caiko'dhyāsato bhāsato'nyaḥ
sthāpyo vācyas tattvato naiva kaścit.

(19.8) *APOHASIDDHIḤ SAMĀPTĀ*

(19.9) kṛtir iyam Mahāpaṇḍita Ratnakīrttipādānām.

(19.10-17) bhavatv apohe kṛtinām prapañco
vastusvarūpāsphuraṇantu marmma.
tatrādṛḍhe sarvvam ayatnaśīrṇam
dṛḍhe tu sausthyan nanu tāvataiva.

[286] Lit., "and if there is no object (of it), (it) cannot be conjoined with denotative-ness".

[287] tritayena yuktaḥ.

[288] samayaḥ. Or determining judgment.

[289] phala.

[290] śakti. May mean indirect force of word (lakṣaṇā or vyañjanā).

[291] upādhiḥ. That is itself a mental construction. An imposed property is "imposed" only because it is not present.

[292] vācya.

[293] vyāpti-siddhiḥ, *RN.*, p. 61., the text ends here.

[294] vyāpyate.

[295] adhyavasita-bāhya-viṣayatvena.

[296] vipakṣa here aviṣayavattvalakṣaṇa, i.e., animittavattva or absolute existence, the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa).

[297] arthaḥ or the particular.

[298] guṇatvena. According to the Buddhist view Reality is unitary.

[299] adhyāsato bhāsato'nyaḥ.

[300] sthāpya, lit., to be stable.

[301] pādānām. Lit. (a work) of the revered feet. According to an Indian custom one must not pronounce the name of one's teacher, husband and parents or elders. Manu has also given an ordinance to this effect.

[302] Or: may this be a complex (prapañcaḥ) presentation of Differentiation (as the meaning of Word).

[303] tatra lit., there.

[304] sausthyam. Or remains healthy. There is pun in this verse, i.e., if one keeps his body fit and strong he lives long and healthy.

has nothing as its direct meaning, then, it cannot be designated as denotative.[286]

(18.16-18). To this (Ratnakīrti rejoins): (Our view that a word denotes a mentally constructed relation of *A* and *non-A* is supported by the threefold[287] (reasoning): (1) For, (notwithstanding the opponent's view that the thing-in-itself is to be denoted), there can be no conditioning[288] of the beginning and the end (of the thing which is momentary and thus constantly in Flux; for beginning and end are expressed by words only on the basis of our mental construction); (2) neither a logical (syllogistic) conclusion,[289] (nor) the indirect expressive force (suggestion, pun etc.) of the word[290] is possible (if the momentary external object is to be denoted); (3) (and if the opponent argues that the word denotes the momentary thing only at) the present (point of time), then, there is also the difficulty that an imposed property[291] shall not be denoted (by a word at all).

(18.19). Thus, the direct import of a term[292] is nothing other (than differentiation).

(19.1-3). The logical connexion (between a term and its meaning as differentiation) has been established (as follows):[293]

"Denotative-ness (of the term) is pervaded[294] by the external (momentary) object of the mental operation (i.e., differentiation),[295] (and being) excluded from dissimilar cases.[296]

(19.4-7). It is, in fact, *the* thing[297] which is primarily (or mainly) expressed by words, and discrimination is apprehended there as being its attribute.[298] And the thing is one (point instant), (the essence of which) is different from a mental construction and sense reflexion.[299] In reality there is nothing to be denoted (as) constant and permanent (i.e. a positive universal existence).[300]

(19.8). Here ends the work entitled "*apohasiddhiḥ*" or "the Establishment of Differentiation".

(19.9). This is a work of the great scholar, the revered[301] Ratnakīrti.

(19.10-17). May this be known as a difficult work on Differentiation;[302] its essence is that what is reflected in our mind (from words), is not the self-nature of the positive (momentary) thing.

In the world[303] whatsoever is not-firm decays (because of) not being maintained with effort. But, if firm, a thing lasts long.[304] For this

sampūrṇa rātri-praharadvayena
Kīrtter *Apoho* likhitaḥ sukhena.
Trailokyadattena parātmahetoḥ.
yatnād ato'yam parirakṣaṇīyaḥ.

very reason (and) to benefit others,[305] (this work) "Apoha" of (Ratna) Kīrti has been copied with beautiful writing[306] by Trailokya-datta in one full night and two quarters of a day. (Since it is a valuable Buddhist philosophical work written with great effort) it must be kept with great care.[307]

[305] parātmhetoḥ.
[306] Sukhena. 'Leisure' in this context seems to have no significance, and therefore, I am inclined to read "sulekhena" meaning "with Beautiful writing".
[307] Stcherbatsky writes that as it was "written in one night and probably for this reason lacking clearness" (*BL*, Vol. II, p. 404). However, it must be pointed out that it was *copied* in one night – not written.

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GLOSSARY

Sanskrit — English

abhāva absence, non-existence, non-Ens, non-Being
adhikaraṇa locus
adhyakṣa = *pratyakṣa* pure sensation, direct perception
adhyavasāya = *vikalpa* pure non-sensual cognition, logical synthesis
ākāra = *ākṛti* = *sāmānya* = *jāti* Gestalt, configuration, form, class, universal
anaikāntikaḥ-hetu fallacy of *inconclusive reason*
anavasthā infinite regress
anupalabdhi = *dṛśyānupalabdhi* negative inference, non-perception of a perceptible
anumāna inference, inferential *means*,
anuyogaḥ explanation, application, tabular formulation
anyavyāvṛitti = *anyāpoha* negation of the other, exclusion of the discrepant
arthakriyā-kāritva causal efficiency
arthāpattiḥ (meaning by) implication
asiddhaḥ-hetu invalid *reason*
asaṅgata-hetu, inconsistent *reason*
atiprasaṅgaḥ universal-absurdity
bhāva presence, existence, Ens, Being
buddhyākāra ideal-image (as opposed to external form)
dharma attribute, qualification, predicate, property
dharmin locus of *dharma*, qualificand, substance, subject
dravya substance, matter
dṛṣṭavyabhicāra apparent-inconsistency

hetu reason, middle term, probans.
jñānāṃśālambanatva a fact based on the cognitive aspect of reality
jñāpya-jñāpakabhāva-sambandha denotable-denotative relation
kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha causal relation, cause-effect relation
kṣaṇa a moment
kṣaṇika momentary reality, point-instant (the-thing-in-itself)
liñga mark, sign, logical mark, middle term, reason, probans
māna = *pramāṇa* *means* of knowledge, *source* of knowledge
meya = *prameya* = *padartha* knowable, object of knowledge, ontological category
nipāta proposition (in grammar)
nirālambanatva *a priori* cognitive fact
niraṃśatve = *akhaṇḍatva* indivisible or unitary nature of reality
niṣedha = *pratiṣedha* negation, negative proposition
padārtha meaning of word, ontological category
pakṣa an occurance of *vyāpti* relation, (in the syllogism) an example of *similar* instance to *sādhya* or the major term possessor of the probandum.
paramārtha-sat ultimate-reality
paryudāsa negation by implication
prasajya-pratiṣedha simple negation, direct negation
pratyabhijñā rememberance, a proposition "This is That".
pratyakṣa perception
pravṛtti propositional attitude
prayogaḥ syllogistic formula
śabda word, speech
śabda-pratyaya import of the word
sādhya that which one wishes to prove, the major term, the probandum
sāmānya universal, class, category Universality
samavāya inherence relation
samvṛtti-sat dialectical reality
siddha-sādhana a *petitio principii*
sva-lakṣaṇa = *svabhāva* the-thing-in-itself, momentary reality, point-instant
upādhi imposed property
vācya-vācaka-sambandha denotable-denotative relation

vākya statement, sentence

vidhi affirmation, affirmative statement, positive sentence

vikalpa = *adhyavasāya* a concept, logical synthesis, logical category

vipakṣa non-*pakṣa*, an occurance of dissimilar case to *sādhya* or the major term, an instance where the probandum does not occur.

viparyaya-jñāna = *vivekākhyāti* = *smṛti-pramoṣa* confusion of memory

virodha opposition, contradiction

viruddhaḥ-hetuḥ fallacy of *incompatibility*

viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇatā-bhāva-sambandha = *dharmi-dharma-sambandha* particular qualification relation, qualifier and qualificand relation

vyakti = *viśeṣa* individual, particular, qualificand

vyāpti pervasion, invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum

vyāpti-jñāna = *vyāpti-dhī* knowledge of a pervasion

vyāvṛtta-viṣaya object of differentiation, qualificand

INDICES

A. PROPER NAMES

B. SANSKRIT WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS